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ABSTRACT 
 
When oil prices rise, politicians often call for improvements in energy efficiency 
or policies that they hope will make the U.S. more “energy independent.”  The argument 
is that if we consume less oil, domestic supplies will constitute a larger portion of U.S. 
quantity demanded, mitigating our dependence on potentially unreliable foreign oil 
sources, thereby lessening U.S. exposure to volatile supply/price fluctuations.  Three 
interrelated issues are addressed in this dissertation.  First, the drivers and substitution 
patterns in U.S. oil demand are explored using structural demand system analysis for 
energy in the U.S.  Second, world oil supply is estimated using the cost structure of 
world oil reservoirs, which principally depend on reservoir characteristics.  Models of 
both supply and demand yield insight into the feasibility and unintended outcomes of 
policies or technological advances that reduce oil demand.  Finally, the U.S. autarky 
equilibrium price at the intersection of the U.S. supply and demand curves is considered.  
Inferences on the economic feasibility for the U.S. to strive towards self-sufficiency in 
oil are examined including the vulnerability premium associated with national security 
concerns. 
The demand model demonstrates that U.S. oil demand is explained as a system of 
demands for energy, where individuals are committed in the short run to minimum 
quantities of consumption.  In the context of pre-commitments, oil is found to have a 
higher own-price elasticity (more elastic) at average than is commonly found in the 
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literature. Oil is further demonstrated to be a compliment for natural gas and electricity, 
and a substitute for coal.  
Oil production costs and quantities are heavily dependent upon reservoir 
geology, which has a fixed dispersion around the world.  Using this premise, a supply 
curve composed of world oil reservoirs is generated.  Scenario analysis on different 
world oil demand reductions suggests there are unintended costs of reducing oil demand.   
Oil producing countries will experience smaller gross domestic products from 
diminished oil production.  Smaller gross domestic products may affect the countries’ 
political stability.   
The world oil supply curve and cross price elasticities from the demand model 
are considered together under the most likely scenario of a fall in world oil demand 
stemming from a 2.5% decrease in U.S. oil demand. These results are used to consider 
unintended consequences of changes in U.S. oil demand in attempts to achieve or pursue 
“energy independence.” These results include the impact on coal, natural gas, and 
electricity demand; the required change in gasoline demand that could precipitate a 2.5% 
change in oil demand; the change in U.S. GDP; the change in U.S. “energy 
independence” and; the change in political stability of oil producing nations.  
U.S. supply and demand curves for oil will not intersect in the short run with 
current technology. The implication is that the vulnerability premium for oil would need 
to be infinite to justify U.S. self-sufficiency in oil.  The U.S., therefore, should not strive 
towards energy independence in oil.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
 
In recent years, as crude oil (henceforth oil) and gasoline prices have increased 
rapidly, arguments similar to those popular during the 1970’s gas price increases have 
arisen.  Again, there are calls for both increased exploration and production activities 
domestically and policies that will decrease U.S. gasoline and oil consumption. 
Increasing domestic production, if possible, will clearly increase the ratio of 
domestically produced oil to imported oil that the U.S. consumes. Arguments for 
policies that reduce domestic consumption, however, hinge on the hope that with the 
reduction, U.S. demand can be satisfied by domestic sources (Bengston, 2011; 
Richardson, 2009; Stephen, 2007).  The argument is that by increasing the proportion of 
quantity demanded met by domestic sources, the influence of cartels and politically 
unstable oil producing nations that threaten U.S. national security and contribute to a 
tumultuous world oil market may be reduced. 
Whether or not such policies will be effective in achieving the desired result is 
questionable; determining their efficacy promises to be challenging.  The challenge is 
daunting because of the importance of petroleum products in virtually every aspect of 
society.  Energy drives the economy.  Energy prices, therefore, influence economic 
growth (Ayres et al., 2007).  With energy acting as an input in every stage of production, 
policy changes that alter energy consumption through taxes or mandatory reductions will 
inevitably initiate repercussions throughout the economy.  
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Though every ramification of a policy that would reduce oil consumption is 
indeterminable, insights can be gained regarding the efficacy of such policies in 
achieving the desired result.  Both demand and supply must be considered in modeling 
market outcomes. It is the intersection of supply and demand, after all, that determines 
the equilibrium price and quantity after any shift in demand. To determine demand side 
changes, demand must be modeled not only for oil, but also for its substitutes and 
compliments, allowing substitution patterns to be explored.  Changes in supply are also 
crucial to the overall impact of a policy, because the shutdown or withdrawal of any U.S. 
production necessitates additional U.S. demand reduction for foreign oil dependence to 
wane.  Supply must reflect regional eccentricities, to determine the changes in the supply 
balance that might occur if the U.S. reduces its demand.  
1.1. Objectives 
Providing insights into oil and energy demand and supply based on “more realistic” 
assumptions of human behavior associated with demand for oil; physical characteristics 
of oil production; and demand and supply curve characterizations than used in previous 
studies is the objective of this study.  To achieve this objective, three different aspects of 
oil supply and demand are examined.  Each aspect has its own sub-objective(s) and 
model. 
First, U.S. demand for oil is estimated under the assumptions of pre-commitments 
and a system of demands that includes multiple energy commodities.  Pre-commitment 
levels are the quantity of a good that is demanded in the short run with little regard for 
price because of prior commitments to either meet production or consumption 
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requirements.  The sub-objective is to examine how accounting for pre-commitment 
levels influences the energy commodity demand system.   
The second aspect’s sub-objective is to examine the effect of policies that are 
directed towards reducing world oil demand.  Under the assumption that the physical 
reservoir characteristics are the primary factors influencing the cost of oil production, a 
world oil supply curve is developed.  Different policy scenarios of world and U.S. 
reduction in demand are examined in terms of the effect on each country’s quantity 
supplied of oil and gross domestic product.   
Finally, using the demand model and the U.S. component of the world supply model, 
the feasibility of the U.S. becoming oil self-sufficient or independent is examined.  The 
sub-objective is to provide information on the U.S. equilibrium price to help determine if 
the U.S. should be self-sufficient in oil production. 
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CHAPTER II  
U.S. CRUDE OIL DEMAND WITH PRE-COMMITMENTS 
 
Oil and its derivatives, such as gasoline, have a strong influence on the economies of 
industrialized countries.  What makes these commodities uniquely influential has to do 
with the capital and products that depend on them.  Oil derivatives are virtually without 
substitutes in their many roles including powering and lubricating internal combustion 
engines.  It is reasonable to expect the own-price elasticity of oil to be highly inelastic.  
Elasticities are highly inelastic because internal combustion engines and other oil 
dependent capital are expensive and are purchased in advance by industry and 
individuals to produce certain short run levels of output.  It, therefore, stands to reason 
that oil demand, at least in the short run, would be highly inelastic. 
Highly inelastic short run own-price elasticities for oil are consistently found in the 
literature (Cooper, 2003; Gately and Huntington, 2002; Krichene, 2002).  Inelastic own 
price elasticities imply that price increases have little impact on quantity demanded in 
the short run.  None of these papers, however, have studied demand for oil as a 
commodity within a system of demand for energy with pre-commitment levels.  Pre-
commitments are defined as the quantity of a good that is demanded in the short run with 
little regard for price; demand is virtually perfectly inelastic.  If individuals have 
committed to consume a given quantity of oil then the price of oil will have little effect 
over this portion of the demand curve.  Over the committed portion of demand, oil can 
be treated as non-discretionary with correspondingly very inelastic price elasticity.  Once 
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pre-commitments have been satisfied price variations have a larger impact on quantity 
demanded.  This portion of the demand curve can be thought of as discretionary (for 
example, purchasing a tank of gas to go on vacation).  
The demand for oil, therefore, may be more accurately modeled by considering pre-
commitment levels.  Relative to elasticity estimates that do not control for pre-
commitment levels (henceforth, referred to as contract levels) own-price elasticity 
estimates should be larger in absolute value (more elastic) by including contract levels.  
To understand the logic behind this assertion, assume demand can be broken into two 
components: contract level consumption (having elasticity near zero) and discretionary 
consumption.  Ignoring these two components during estimation would result in an 
elasticity measure that is a weighted average of the two components.  A weighted 
average of both components misrepresents both components with an elasticity measure 
that is too large in the contract portion of the demand curve and too small for the 
discretionary portion.  If the U.S. operates predominately in the discretionary portion of 
the demand curve (meaning that contract levels have been satisfied), ignoring contract 
levels will lead to an elasticity measure that is too inelastic.  
A more inelastic measure implies that consumers are less responsive to price 
changes.  Such an implication may influence policy that is aimed at energy and crude oil 
consumption.  If consumers are modeled as being less responsive to price changes than 
they actually are, then policy aimed at curtailing oil consumption would necessitate 
raising prices to higher levels than necessary to achieve the policy’s goal.  The converse 
is also true. With a contract level scenario, own price elasticities are more elastic in the 
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discretionary portion, but much less elastic near the contract level boundary (nearly 
perfectly inelastic). Raising the price of a nearly perfectly inelastic good does not do 
much to curtail quantity demanded. Instead, consumption remains nearly the same.  
Assumptions concerning contract levels, therefore, may have an impact on demand 
system estimation, as well as, a more practical impact on policy.  Oil demand for the 
U.S. is estimated via the Generalized Almost Ideal (GAI) Demand System (Bollino, 
1987) to discover contract quantities and estimate demand elasticities over the 
discretionary portion of demand.  
Similar pre-commitment arguments can be made for the other primary energy 
commodities in the energy system of the U.S, which are natural gas, coal, and electricity.  
By modeling as a system, the effect of pre-commitments on the elasticities for these 
commodities can also be ascertained.   
2.1. Objective 
The objective is to examine how accounting for pre-commitment levels influences 
the energy commodity system.   Differences between a demand model system with pre-
commitments and one without are compared.  Differences considered include 
significance of the coefficients, shape of the demand curve, and price and wealth 
elasticities that result under the two specifications.  In addition, the estimated elasticities 
are compared to estimates from the literature.  To accomplish this objective, a system of 
demands for energy that includes oil, coal, natural gas, and electricity is estimated.  The 
estimation takes two forms: the Generalized Almost Ideal Demand System (GAIDS or 
GAI for short), which endogenously estimates pre-commitment levels and the Almost 
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Ideal Demand System (AIDS or AI), which does not explicitly consider contract levels 
for comparison. 
2.2. Literature Review 
Models have been developed to quantify and predict both U.S. and world oil 
demand.  Although the specific approaches vary, the vast majority of models fall into the 
category of the lagged endogenous models, which posit oil demand as a linear or log 
linear function of wealth and indexes of price and lagged prices (Dahl and Sterner, 
1991).  The current and lagged price structures allow both short and long run price 
elasticities to be estimated.  In most cases, the short run is the marginal effect of current 
price, while the long run is the marginal effect of the lagged price.  Dahl and Sterner 
(1991) in their review of over 100 studies, find that of the studies they surveyed, the 
average short run own price elasticity of gasoline is -0.26 and the long run own price 
elasticity is -0.86.  Implications of these elasticities are that the past price has a larger 
impact on quantity demanded than the current price and that purchasing habits are slow 
to adjust to price changes.  Dahl and Sterner (1991) also stated that the studies surveyed 
take different approaches on seasonality.  They find that there is a striking difference 
between the results obtained when seasonality is taken into account, as opposed to 
annual measures.  Dahl and Sterner (1991) conclude that seasonal data is inappropriate 
because the results are unpredictable and lack robustness, especially in the long run. 
Cooper (2003) uses a lagged endogenous model to portray oil demand for 23 
countries.  Each country is modeled independently.  U.S. own price elasticity is found to 
be -0.061 in the short run and -0.453 in the long run.  Krichene (2002) simultaneously 
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estimated two interdependent lagged endogenous world demand models: one where oil 
is the dependent variable and the other where natural gas is the dependent variable.  In 
doing so, she is able to take advantage of the robustness and simplicity of the lagged 
endogenous model while accounting for certain interdependencies in the energy market.  
Krichene (2002) finds that the crude oil demand price elasticity is -0.005 in the most 
recent period estimated (1973-1999) which is almost perfectly inelastic. 
Lin (2011) estimates oil supply and demand simultaneously and in the same manner 
and time period as Krichene, but decomposed prices and quantities into OPEC and non 
OPEC, yielding one of the most elastic measures for oil own-price elasticity of -0.095.  
A major departure from previous literature in estimating the simultaneous supply and 
demand equations for oil is the use of instrumental variables to deal with the 
identification problem of simultaneous estimation.  
Karimu and Brannlund (2012) argue that energy demand models, like the above, too 
commonly rely on parametric models, such as the lagged endogenous model, and other 
log-linear models, which are less robust and more likely to be mis-specified than 
nonparametric models.  They argue that most parametric models in energy demand are 
chosen for their computational convenience and ease of interpretation, not for their 
ability to explain the data or underlying behaviors.  Their approach contrasts a log-linear 
demand estimate with a nonparametric kernel estimate using 1990 to 2006 data. They 
test and reject the log-linear specification and find that their less restrictive 
nonparametric model generates a more inelastic own price elasticity at -0.18 to -0.19, for 
energy as an aggregate.  
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Rothman and Ho Hong (1994) estimated oil demand utilizing three common 
structural demand models: translog, almost ideal, and logit.  Their study tests the 
appropriateness of these different functional forms for energy demand beyond oil by 
including natural gas, electricity, and aggregates for liquid fuels, and food energy.  They 
conclude the logit model better approximates demand for world energy and delivers 
more robust elasticity measures.  Rothman and Ho Hong (1994), however, note the 
potential shortcoming of aggregating so many energy commodities and considering 
world demand instead of regional demands.  They suggest that with less aggregation 
over commodities, the almost ideal model may do a better job explaining the data.  
Calculated energy demand price elasticities ranged from -0.6 to -1.0, which are 
substantially more elastic than most estimates from other studies.  
Serletis and Shahmoradi (2008) examine the substitutability of energy commodities 
in the U.S. using the functional demand forms of the Fourier and Asymptotically Ideal 
Models (AIM).  They include coal, natural gas, and crude oil in both equations as 
commodities demanded, but excluded electricity as separable in the representative 
agent’s utility function from the other energy commodities.  The functional forms 
utilized yield parameter estimates with global regularity.  Their own price elasticity 
estimates for oil are -0.253 and -0.635 for the two models.  
Differences between previous elasticity estimates partially stem from differences in 
structural versus reduced form models and their varying ability to explain the data.  
Additional differences can be attributed to the utilization of a demand system, which 
accounts for substitution between commodities.  
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2.3. Model 
Estimating a linear, reduced form demand equation, as has been the predominant 
method in the literature, only partially controls for contract levels through estimation of 
a constant term.  For a more precise treatment and interpretation of this contract 
quantity, the Generalized Almost Ideal (GAI) Demand System developed by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980) and Bollino (1987) provides the basis for estimation.  GAI is 
specified as 
'' ( ' )ˆ1 lni ii i i i i
c p c p c pw p
P
    
                                                                (2.1) 
where 
contract level of consumption of commodity  in billions of barrels (bbl) of oil  equivalent,
  column vector of ,
total expenditure on oil, natural gas, coal and electricity,
 real price for
i
i
i
c i
c c
p




  bbl of oil equivalent of commodity ,
 column vector of ,
 quantity of commodity  consumed in billions bbl/year of oil,
 =budget share for commodity ,
ˆ  diagonal matrix of 
error t
i
i
i i
i
i
i
i
p p
q i
p qw i
p p






 erm,  and
ln Stone's price index.i i
i
P Exp w p    
 
 Traditionally, P is represented by the translog price index 
0
1ln ln ln ln .2k k kl k lk k l
P p p p                                                                     (2.2) 
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For ease of calculation, Stone’s price index is used.  Using Stone’s index instead of the 
translog price index leads to what is known as the Linear Approximate Generalized 
Almost Ideal (LA/GAI) Demand System.  The approximation comes because Stone’s 
price index is log linear as opposed to the highly non-linear translog price index.  The 
contract level for each commodity is endogenous to the model.  When the contract level 
is restricted to zero, the Generalized Almost Ideal Demand System (GAIDS) becomes 
the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). 
Adding up, homogeneity, and symmetry restrictions, 
( ) 1 0 0,
( ) 0, and
( ) ,
i i ij
i i i
ji
i
ij ji
i
ii
iii
  

 
  


  
  
 
are imposed on the model.  Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) find that homogeneity is 
often rejected, which leads to the rejection of symmetry, given that symmetry is more 
restrictive than homogeneity.  Nevertheless, it is common practice to impose all three 
sets of restrictions in accordance with economic theory.  Further, the addition of the 
symmetry restriction may not significantly alter results after the imposition of 
homogeneity (Deaton, 1974).  These restrictions are imposed because they are consistent 
with economic theory and the limited number of data points (yearly data for 1980-2009). 
Using Stone’s price index as an approximation affords opportunities other than 
simply making the demand system easier to estimate.  An added benefit is that the price 
elasticity calculations for commodities i  and j  are simplified to 
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 ij i jij ij
i i
w
w w
      ,                                                                                                     (2.3) 
where δ is the Kroeneker Delta.  Alston et al. (1994) demonstrate that wealth elasticities 
are 
1 /i i iw   .                                                                                                                (2.4) 
2.4. Data 
Price and quantity demanded data are obtained from the Department of Energy (U.S. 
DOE, 2009) for oil, electricity, natural gas, and coal.  This data contains annual price 
from 1980 to 2008 in different units for each commodity.  All commodity prices are 
converted to price per barrel of oil equivalent ($/bbl).  Similarly, quantity data is posted 
in various units depending upon the commodity.  All quantity data is converted to billion 
bbl/yr equivalent (a measure of potential energy equal to that present in a barrel of oil).  
The conversion puts all contract level estimates and cross price elasticity estimates into 
the same units for straightforward interpretation.  The original units for natural gas, coal, 
and electricity quantities are billions of cubic feet, thousands of short tons, and millions 
of kilowatt hours.  Short ton of coal is converted to barrel of oil equivalent (boe) by 
multiplying by short ton to metric ton conversion (one short ton equals 0.907 metric 
tons) and then dividing by barrel of oil equivalent (one boe equals 0.2 metric tons of 
coal) (Ag Decision Maker, 2008).  The final conversion factors for equating each 
commodity’s quantity from its original form (units/time) to billions of boe are 
1.72/10,000; 0.043/10,000; 0.0059/10,000 for natural gas, coal, and electricity.  Because 
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oil is already in boe, the conversion factor is only to change from thousands of bbls/day 
to billions bbls/year, which is 365/1,000,000. 
 2.5. Estimation and Results 
In estimating this system, it is necessary to simultaneously estimate four equations 
(one demand equation for each commodity) because of cross parameterization.  
Specifically, the contract level of a commodity is endogenously estimated in its demand 
equation.  Each demand equation also uses an aggregation of all contract levels for the 
supernumerary expenditure calculation  
௖ᇱ௣
ఓ .  To obtain an estimate of the 
supernumerary expenditure calculation that includes all contract levels, either recursive 
or simultaneous methods must be used.  Taking this into account, a seemingly unrelated 
regression model is used as is the typical method for dealing with expenditure systems 
and other systems with supernumerary expenditure and contract levels.  
Demand systems, specifically the almost ideal demand system, have been used in the 
past to estimate energy elasticities and other demand parameters (Rothman and Ho 
Hong, 1994).  As such, there are similar works against which the estimates obtained here 
can be compared.  To compare against a system that does not explicitly account for pre-
commitments, the LA/GAI system is compared against the LA/AI. 
The parameter estimates, including the endogenously estimated contract levels for 
each demand equation for LA/GAI, are in Table 2.1.  With the exception of contract 
levels, the parameters themselves do not directly yield to economic interpretation.  The 
elasticities derived from both models are displayed in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. 
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The cross price elasticity estimates in Table 2.2 suggest that most commodities in the 
system are compliments (negative cross price elasticity) instead of substitutes with the 
possible exceptions of oil and coal (GAI) and natural gas and coal (GAI).  Natural gas 
and coal in particular are intuitively substitutes because both are used as feedstocks in 
the production of electricity.  Neither of these elasticities, however, are significant at the 
10% level.  All other commodity pairs that are significant at the 10% level or less are 
compliments.  In the LA/GAI system, eight of the sixteen estimated price elasticites are 
significant at the 10% or less level, whereas, in the LA/AI system 14 of 16 elasticites are 
significant.  All own-price elasticites are significant. 
Oil has a complimentary relationship with natural gas and electricity such that if oil 
prices increase by 1%, demand for natural gas and electricity fall by 0.22% and 0.26% in 
the LA/GAI system.  Natural gas and electricity also have a significant relationship as 
compliments where a 1% increase in the price of natural gas reduced electricity demand 
by 0.30%.  
The own price elasticities calculated from the two models are as expected.  That is, 
own price elasticity measures for each commodity estimated using LA/AI are more 
inelastic than own price elasticity measures estimated using LA/GAI (at the average 
price and consumption levels).  This result reinforces the intuition that if contract levels 
are a legitimate restriction on demand then own price elasticity estimates that do not 
account for contract levels will be more inelastic.  
A similar explanation can be used to understand the wealth elasticities in Table 2.3. 
In the GAI specification, both oil and natural gas are luxuries with elasticities greater 
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than one, whereas coal and electricity are necessities with elasticities smaller than one. 
In the AI specification, the estimated wealth elasticities for both oil and natural gas are 
smaller (less elastic) and the estimated wealth elasticities for both coal and electricity are 
larger (more elastic).  Oil changes from a luxury to a necessary good, whereas electricity 
changes from a necessary to a luxury good.  In both models, wealth elasticities were 
calculated at average price and consumption levels.   
In Table 2.4 one can see that for oil and natural gas, contract levels account for 87% 
of average consumption compared to 74% and 68% for coal and electricity.  Recall from 
earlier discussion that the closer we are to the contract level, without accounting for it 
through model specification, elasticity estimates will exhibit more inelasticity.  The 
contract levels in Table 2.4 coincide with approximately 68-87 percent of average 
demand for energy commodities.  It is also apparent from Table 2.4 that electricity, the 
energy commodity with the smallest average quantity demanded per year, has the lowest 
contract level (as a percentage of average demand). 
It has yet to be demonstrated, however, that contract levels are indeed a legitimate 
restriction on demand for oil and energy.  Because the AI model is nested within the 
GAI (AI specification falls out of GAI when contract levels are restricted to zero), a log 
likelihood ratio test can be used.  Akaiki and Bayesian information criterion (AIC and 
BIC), which are other measures for comparison, are also considered.  Because both the 
AIC and BIC are loss metrics, a smaller score represents a better fit.  Both metrics are 
smaller for the GAI specification (Table 2.5). 
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The likelihood ratio test rejects the less restrictive model (LA/GAI) if twice the 
difference of the log-likelihood values exceeds a given value.  For these models, with a 
difference of four degrees of freedom between specifications, GAI performs 
significantly better at the 1% level if the log-likelihood ratio statistic is greater than 
18.47.  The ratio between the two models is 73.11, implying that LA/GAI more 
accurately fits the data; forcing contract levels to zero is an unreasonable restriction. 
It is informative to generate forecasts for commodity demands to compare the 
respective fits of each model to the data.  Given the small number of observations in-
sample forecasts are generated rather than the preferred out-of-sample forecasts.  The 
actual quantity of each commodity demanded, as well as quantity demanded estimates 
using LA/GAI and LA/AI models from 1980 to 2008 are given in Figure 2.1.  For each 
commodity, LA/GAI appears to follows the actual quantity demanded more closely than 
the LA/AI model.  The better fit of LA/GAI is further demonstrated by having a 
consistently lower root mean squared errors compared to the root mean squared errors 
associated with the LA/AI model (Table 2.6).  Inference from these tests and 
comparisons leads to the inference, that a model, which restricts contract levels to zero, 
imposes less realistic restrictions on the demand system than the model with contract 
levels.  
Demand curves for each commodity under the LA/AI and LA/GAI specifications are 
illustrated in Figure 2.2.  The demand curves for each commodity are calculated at the 
average observed price and quantity for all other commodities.  For instance, when the 
demand curves for oil are generated, prices and quantities of natural gas, coal, and 
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electricity are held constant at their average over the observed time period.  The location 
of each pair of graphs in price and quantity space is less important than their slopes and 
relative positions to each other.  Depending upon assumptions about the prices and 
quantities of the other commodities in the system, these two curves can move around in 
price and quantity space.  Nonetheless, these graphs illustrate an important inference.  
Policies that might curtail the quantity demanded for oil (or any of the other energy 
commodities in the demand system) are less effective in a world where GAI and contract 
levels represent the “truth” concerning demand than in a LA/AI world.  
2.6. Discussion  
Energy and oil demand intuitively depend on contract levels.  Estimation results and 
elasticities appear to confirm this intuition.  A likelihood ratio test rejects the Almost 
Ideal in favor of the Generalized Almost Ideal.  The Bayesian and Akaike’s information 
criterion yield similar results; Generalized Almost Ideal specification is preferred over 
the Almost Ideal.  Further, the coefficients representing contract levels are highly 
significant.  Contract levels are over 68% of average quantity demanded.  Because 
energy prices heavily influence macroeconomic variables, responses to price fluctuations 
are important in forecasting economic welfare of policy changes.  Concerns of self-
sufficiency and global warming, as well as, shifting political climates have brought with 
them ideologies which will affect energy prices.  If policy makers wish to reduce carbon 
emission through cap and trade or other abatement policies, they need an accurate 
measure of demand responsiveness, which is captured through price elasticities.  They 
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must also be aware of the cross price effects of policies in one commodity market on 
other commodity markets.   
Imposing abatement policies on one commodity market in a system as if the 
activities in that market are independent from the other(s) could larger than anticipated 
impacts on the industry in question or the economy as a whole.  Further, the 
relationships between commodities could cause the policy to be rendered ineffective.  
Using the estimated cross price elasticities, a policy that results in an increase in the 
price of oil would reduce the quantity of oil demanded, but also reduce the demand for 
electricity and natural gas, and raise the demand for coal.  If the goal of the policy is to 
reduce carbon emissions by increasing oil prices, for instance, coal consumption could 
increase as a result, yielding greater overall carbon emissions, ceteris parabis. 
The cross price elasticity estimates indicate that in the short run nearly all energy 
commodities in the system are compliments with the exception of natural gas and coal, 
and oil and coal.  The cross price elasticity estimates under LA/GAI, however, are not 
statistically different from zero for coal and oil.  These results coupled with the wealth 
elasticities indicate that at least in the short run cross price elasticity measures are 
impacted more by wealth effects than substitution effects.  The immediate implication is 
that a major part of the short run result from a policy or supply shock that increased oil 
price, for example, would be a decrease in both consumer wealth and consumption of 
other energy commodities in the system.  Such a policy or shock would not only harm 
consumers, but other industries within the energy system. 
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Consider the world under the assumptions in the oil panel of Figure 2.2.  If a demand 
system without contract levels is appropriate, a policy aimed at reducing oil consumption 
could accomplish a decrease in consumption from 7.6 billion bbls/year to 6.6 billion 
bbls/year by increasing the price of a barrel of oil by $3.39.  If the demand system with 
contract levels is appropriate, the same reduction in quantity demanded would 
necessitate a price increase of $51.74/bbl.  A policy aimed at any other commodity in the 
system would result in a similar outcome.  
Several studies have estimated oil and energy own-price elasticities for the U.S. 
without the inclusion of contract levels.  In Krichene (2002) the own-price elasticities 
from the short run error correction model and the long run estimation range from -0.02 
to -0.13.  Similarly, Cooper (2003), who estimates oil demand for 23 countries, estimates 
an own price elasticity for oil of -0.06 and -0.45 for the short and long run.  The LA/AI 
model estimate elasticity is similar to the short run specifications estimated in these two 
papers with an elasticity of -0.11.  All of these results exhibit extreme short run 
inelasticity.  The LA/GAI, however, returns an own price elasticity of -0.3, which 
although still inelastic is far more elastic than previous short run calculations.  Again, 
this is the anticipated result that a contract level model will find demand is more own 
price elastic when quantity demanded is above the contract level and less own price 
elastic when quantity demanded is at or near the contract level. Another consideration is 
that when the consumption of any energy commodity in the system is near its contract 
level, policy makers need to be aware that price responsiveness of demand is much 
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smaller and price-centric abatement policies will have less of an impact on consumption 
and more of an impact on consumer wealth. 
Rothman and Ho Hong (1994) also used an almost idea model to explain energy 
demand.  They found energy elasticities near -1 using both logit and almost idea models.  
Though they conclude that the logit model is superior to the almost idea specification 
when applied to energy, they suggest that further delineation of “energy” into specific 
components or commodities could improve estimating power and efficiency.  Serletis 
and Shahmoradi (2008) estimated two structural demand systems, Fourier and 
Asymptotically Ideal, with the same energy commodities considered here with the 
exception of electricity.  The own price elasticity estimates for oil and natural gas 
bounded the LA/AI estimates with the LA/AI estimates being slightly more elastic than 
the Fourier estimation, but considerably less elastic than the Asymptotically Ideal Model 
estimates. 
Contract levels, themselves, are also important.  Implications to policy and 
government involvement in oil and gasoline markets are readily apparent.  Because oil 
and energy commodities are matters of national and economic security, the 
government’s interest in keeping supply available is obvious.  By having ready estimates 
for contract levels, in the case of oil for instance, the government can establish a cushion 
of economic viability in terms of how much oil we need at minimum to keep the 
economy running.  Such an estimate has obvious implications for the strategic petroleum 
reserve and calculating its longevity of economic support if tapped.   
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Specifically, the U.S. petroleum reserve contains more than 0.7 billion bbls of oil.  In 
2008, the U.S. consumed over 2.1 billion bbls of oil imported from OPEC.  The average 
consumption for the U.S., from 1980 to 2008, was 6.5 billion bbls, with a contract level 
of 5.7 billion bbls.  If OPEC were to embargo the U.S., the U.S. would still be supplied 
with 4.4 billion bbls (6.5 - 2.1 = 4.4).  To meet the contract level, there would have to be 
another 1.3 billion bbls (4.4 + 1.3 = 5.7) generated from domestic and other foreign 
sources.   In this circumstance, the strategic petroleum reserve would provide the 
necessary support for only (0.7/1.3) x 365 = 196 days, or about 6.5 months.  
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CHAPTER III  
MODELING WORLD CRUDE OIL SUPPLY BY RESERVOIR PORTFOLIO 
 
Textbook industry level supply models assume each firm has a unique cost function 
attributable to private knowledge, capital structure, and size.  These individual supply 
functions are then aggregated to obtain the industry level supply curve.  This assumption 
of unique cost curves at the firm level may not necessarily be true for the oil production 
industry.  The oil industry is oligopolistic with the major suppliers often cooperating on 
individual production projects (Hill and Hellriegel, 1994).  In the more industrialized oil 
producing countries, there are small-scale fringe producers that take over wells that have 
become less profitable relative to other alternatives larger producers face.  These fringe 
producers do not change the cost structure of the well, but often take over towards the 
end of the well’s productive life.  Each major producer has a unique knowledge set that 
may cause minor stratifications in production costs throughout the industry, but the main 
cost differences in production are not between producers but between production 
reservoirs (Bradley and Wood, 1994).   
A world oil supply curve is developed based upon regional oil production costs and 
quantities.  Reservoir production and lifecycle costs are modeled as a function of 
reservoir characteristics.  The ability to explain production costs as a function of 
reservoir characteristics indicates that production costs are innate to regions of the globe.  
If this is the case, the cost of supplying oil is determined more by the reservoir itself, and 
to a much lesser extent the variations in management techniques of the major producers.  
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The easier, cheaper oil to produce will continue to be easier and cheaper regardless of 
changes in production technology or changes in management.  Variations in production 
technology in particular may affect different types of reservoirs differently.  That is, a 
new technology may be developed that causes heavier more viscous crude oil to flow 
more easily, thereby greatly reducing costs of production from wells and reservoirs 
containing viscous oil.  Even if this technology only changes the costs for heavy oils and 
does nothing for the cost structure of light oils, this technological advancement will most 
likely not make the more viscous oil suddenly cheaper to produce than less viscous oil.  
The dependency of production costs on reservoir characteristics, therefore, implies 
that the resulting world oil supply curve and the current ordering of producing wells and 
countries along the supply curve is ordinal.  That is, changes in production technology 
may reduce the cost of producing oil and even certain types of oil or reservoirs more 
than others, but the ordering of wells and regions from lowest cost of production to 
highest cost of production should remain essentially the same.  This is important because 
it implies that although intensity of production may cause the scale of the supply curve 
to vary, a region’s position along the supply curve is fixed. 
Numerous policy initiatives are directed toward reducing world oil consumption.  
World and country specific policies range from pollution and associated climate change 
initiatives to country specific policies such as U.S. energy independence.  No matter 
what the driver, a reduction in world oil demand would cause world oil price to fall.  As 
world oil prices fall, oil reservoirs with higher relative costs may shut down production.  
If production from a relatively high cost reservoir does not shut down, new production 
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activities on that reservoir may cease, causing production to decrease gradually from the 
reservoir as the established wells reach the end of their lifecycle.  Higher cost reservoirs 
will contribute less to world oil supply with a reduction in world demand and world 
price.  When production from a reservoir becomes infeasible at the prevailing price, the 
region or country loses revenue from the oil production. 
Even if a producing country continues to produce the same quantity of oil after a fall 
in oil prices, the revenues they earn per barrel are smaller, thereby lowering per capita 
GDP, which is highly correlated with every major index of political stability (Marshall, 
2008).  If policies are successful at reducing demand, a potential unintended 
consequence is that oil producing countries, which are currently politically stable, may 
move toward instability, and politically unstable countries may become even more 
unstable as oil revenues and per capita GDP decline.  Such effects need to be considered.   
3.1 Objective 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the effect on the U.S. and world oil 
suppliers of policies that are directed towards reducing world oil demand.  To achieve 
this objective, the cost structure of world oil supply as a function of regional geology, 
namely reservoir characteristics, is modeled.  This reservoir specific, world oil supply 
curve is used in three scenarios where world oil demand shifts is reduced by 2.5%, 5%, 
and 10%.  Potential changes in the oil producing regions that result from each of these 
scenarios are discussed.  Specific questions considered are: 1) how downward shifts in 
world oil demand, regardless of the source, will affect world oil price and oil producing 
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regions; and 2) how changes in U.S. and world oil demand affect U.S. dependence on 
foreign oil.   
3.2 Literature Review 
As expected, there is an enormous volume of literature dealing with oil including 
literature that uses the word “supply.”  Much of this literature, however, mistakenly uses 
the word supply to mean quantity consumed in a given year and not a schedule of prices 
and quantity supplied.  Literature along these lines has been directed towards the 
production of oil and forecasts future production.  Hotelling (1931), for example, argues 
that price paths for any exhaustible natural resource would follow the interest rate, as 
would supply.  His theory poses some weaknesses, for instance, it cannot explain 
backwardation in the oil futures market.  Though a good lens to make general inferences 
about the oil market, Rehrl and Friedrich (2006) argue that it does not explain real world 
observations.   According to Adelman (1993), Hotelling’s theory does not describe oil 
production because it is based on a number of false assumptions including the fixed 
quantity of the asset, the perfect storability of the asset in-situ, and the sole 
proprietorship over the asset allowing preservation to a later date.   In reality, oil 
production more closely resembles the tragedy of the commons, where multiple firms 
produce from the same reservoir and any oil a firm leaves in the ground can be extracted 
by others.   
Sinn (1984) concludes that with costly storage (in-situ), there is an incentive to 
overproduce.  Oil storage in situ is costly and as Adelman (1993 p. 5) notes, “A given 
reserve yields a decreasing flow.  If nothing were done, in time production would cease.”  
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Rehrl and Friedrich (2006) suggest that the “better” model for oil production is a 
Hubbert curve, which tracks production by past production (exploration) and 
technological prowess (total recoverable) using a logistic model.  The importance of this 
line of literature is undeniable to forecast optimal use of a limited resource.  This line, 
however, does not address shorter-term supply curves. Fattouh (2007 p. 7) states 
“despite its main contributions, many economists consider that the literature on resource 
exhaustibility does not provide any insight into the oil price issue.” 
Surprisingly, of this enormous volume of literature relatively few studies have been 
published with the express propose of estimating structural oil supply curves; curves in 
which the quantity supplied is a function of price and other exogenous variables.  There 
is little doubt that a variety of supply and demand models for oil and gas exist, but the 
majority of these likely exist for the internal use of private industries that stand to benefit 
from such models (e.g., international oil and gas companies).   
Although limited, some academic and publicly available research has been 
conducted in modeling world oil supply.  Kennedy (1974) estimated a supply and 
demand model for world crude and other refined products.  Refinery costs for crude and 
specified derived commodities were utilized in a linear programming model to determine 
equilibrium outputs.  He found that competitive forces within OPEC would preclude 
significant future price spikes for oil. Wood et al. (2004) forecast supply quantities based 
upon current and past technologically recoverable barrels without explicit consideration 
of costs. In each scenario they forecast, world oil production will peak sometime in the 
21st century.  
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Both Considine (2006) and Alhajji and Huettner (2000) model supply using separate 
supply functions for OPEC and non-OPEC countries.  Their cost data comes from the 
Department of Energy where Alhajji and Huettner (2000) assume the U.S. is the highest 
marginal cost supplier for the non-OPEC countries.  Supply cost estimates for OPEC 
countries (specifically Saudi Arabia) are estimated as a function of security costs and an 
arbitrarily assigned production cost of $0.50/bbl in 1970 that increases at a 3% rate 
annually.  Considine (2006) took a different approach by estimating a system of supply 
and demand equations using aggregate equilibrium data, but assumed the same cost 
function for OPEC member countries as Alhajji and Huettner (2000). To the author’s 
knowledge, no academic studies have been conducted that estimate a world supply 
curve, using reservoir and well specific production and cost data.  
Concerning strategic production and market structure, there is a breadth of literature 
with conflicting findings.  These findings taken in aggregate provide some justification 
for treating OPEC countries similarly to any other oil producing/exporting country in a 
model.  For instance, Gately (1984) surveys a decade’s worth of research on market 
structure and cartel influence.  Some studies have concluded that there is a first mover or 
cartel advantage to some suppliers (OPEC) while others conclude that the oil supply 
market is competitive (no signs of monopolistic control over output and prices).  Gately 
(1984) concludes that OPEC exhibits some degree of monopolistic control over 
quantities, but that despite a significant amount of attention in the literature, oil supply 
and market structure continue to be overshadowed by many unresolved issues.  Among 
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the disagreements are the cost and capacity of alternatives and the geological resource 
base.   
Also in contention is OPEC’s ability to function as a cartel for extended periods. 
Most evidence points to the contrary.  Adelman (1993) argues that it is in the best 
interest of OPEC member countries to maintain excess capacity whenever possible. 
Further, Tang and Hammoudeh (2002) concluded that OPEC actively manipulated 
production when oil prices diverged from a $15-$25 price band.  Prices have been well 
above the $25/bbl mark every year since the study was published, while OPEC 
production has had no explicit upward trend.  The implication is that OPEC either is 
producing near capacity and unable to increase production sufficiently to lower the price, 
or has changed its target price band to a much higher bracket.  
An individual well or reservoir’s contribution to supply not only depends upon its 
cost structure, but also on strategic or politically motivated depletion paths.  It, therefore, 
is important to understand which explanatory variables define the cost equation for oil 
and their magnitude of impact (parameterization).  Further, other factors that may affect 
production, for instance the fact that oil is an exhaustible resource must also be 
considered.  Oil’s exhaustibility as a resource has been discredited as a major factor 
contributing to world price, but there is no doubt that it becomes a tangible constraint at 
the well or reservoir level. 
Because different technologies are utilized in different oil reservoir types (Directory 
2010), it is possible to model production by reservoir types or characteristics.  Wiggins 
and Libecap (1987) assert that oil production costs are an increasing function of well 
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maturity.  It is reasonable to assume a supply structure where firms’ cost and production 
considerations are heavily influenced by the types of reservoirs they hold in their 
production portfolio (Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2011).  Some firms may 
have cost of production advantages over others, but this would stem from their portfolio, 
which is less technologically demanding.  Though managed by firms or governments, 
wells may then behave as individual price takers. 
Unconventional oil reserves and production also play a role in world oil supply; a 
role which is only expected to grow in the future (Mohr and Evans, 2010). Mohr and 
Evans (2010) model current and future unconventional production.  They find that even 
in the most optimistic scenario, unconventional oil only partially mitigates the peaking 
of the conventional oil supply.  Further, current unconventional production techniques 
require vast water resources (Mohr and Evans, 2010).  Unconventional oil is not 
considered in this study because unconventional oil only represents a marginal 
contribution to current supply, it is on the more expensive side of the supply curve, and 
virtually no data is available. 
3.3 Supply Curve Market Structure 
3.3.1 Market and Cost Structures 
As noted by Beattie and Taylor (1993, p.  164), “The supply function of a firm that 
sells in a perfectly competitive product market gives the quantity that it will produce as a 
function of product price.”  In a perfectly competitive market, a firm sets marginal 
revenue (MR) equal to marginal costs (MC), but price (P) just happens to be equal to 
MR, that is MR = MC = P.  Under perfect competition, a supply curve exists and it is the 
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marginal cost curve.  Several theoretical and real world issues can result in the condition 
of P = MC not holding, creating a wedge between the MC curve and the supply curve.  
Several such issues are imperfect competition, dynamics, and costs associated with 
changes in production.  These issues, which may make the competitive theory of price 
equaling marginal cost in developing a supply curve suspect, are briefly addressed here 
with respect to the world oil market. 
With imperfect competition, such as monopoly, P = MC is not the case.  A firm still 
produces a quantity that equates MR and MC, but MR is no longer equal to the price.  
These firms face a downward sloping demand curve where the marginal revenue 
decreases with production or output.  In imperfect competition, the supply curve is not 
the marginal cost curve.  Ferguson (1966 pp. 236-238) states a supply curve can only be 
developed under different demand scenarios.  The type of competition characterizing the 
world oil market will determine how the supply curve is developed.  
At least four general theories of market structure exist: cartel or monopoly theory, 
dominant firm with a fringe (and its variations), non-profit maximizing model (target 
revenue theory), and competitive model (Griffin 1985).  The first three theories are 
associated with imperfect competition.  As noted above, in these theories price will not 
equal marginal revenue.  Regardless of the theory, a supply curve that represents the 
quantity the market will supply for each price may be developed under various 
assumptions such as differing demand as noted previously.  The development and 
justification of a supply curve, therefore, hinges on one’s assumption of the market 
structure of the world oil market.  Unfortunately, one can find literature supporting any 
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of the general theories or their variations as best explaining world oil supply market 
structure (Smith, 2002; Gately, 1984; Tang and Hammoudeh, 2002).  Time frame, 
methodology, and data limitations partially determine which structure a study determines 
as “best” (Smith, 2002).  Another complicating issue is market changes (demand and/or 
cost fluctuations) that would cause players in an imperfect world to change their output 
will also cause participants in a perfectly competition market to change output levels.  
Empirically, these effects are indistinguishable (Smith, 2002).  The issue becomes, what 
is the correct market structure? 
A second reason price may not equal marginal cost even under perfect competition is 
dynamics associated with the allocation of a fixed stock xt of a resource that is storable 
and allows production in period t, qt, to be deferred to later periods without 
compromising the stock.  To illustrate why price may not equal marginal costs, consider 
the following simplified example.  In this example, let the price at time t be pt, r be the 
discount rate, and costs to the firm of extraction represented by c(qt,xt) where qt is 
quantity produced and xt is the state variable representing the fixed stock of the resource 
at time t.  Further assume the firm’s wants to maximize the net present of the extraction 
of the resource over an infinite-horizon.  Under these simplified conditions the firm’s 
problem is maximize the net present value of the use of the resource 
     1 11max , , ,1t t t t t t t t tq V x p p q c q x V x pr      .                   (3.1) 
The first order condition for maximization with respect to qt is  
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Rearranging this condition gives
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because of scarcity rents issue raised by Hoteling (1931) theory price does not equal 
marginal costs.  Price equals marginal cost if and only if  
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   The magnitude of this wedge between price and 
marginal cost will help determine the extent of the deviation between the marginal cost 
curve and the supply curve. 
Shut down or start-up costs associated with wells are another potential source of a 
wedge between marginal costs and price.  If there are costs to shut down a well, for 
example, a well may continue producing even though the marginal costs are below price 
to avoid these shut down costs.  Similarly, a well that is not currently producing even 
though price is above marginal costs may stay out of production because of the start-up 
costs.  The magnitude of these costs will determine how large the wedge is between 
price and marginal costs.   
3.3.2 Assumptions Made and Justification 
To complete this study, a decision on the market structure must be made.  This 
decision impacts how the supply curve is generated and interpretation.  As noted above, 
the literature is not conclusive on which structure best explains the world oil market.  
Further, over 200 countries produce oil along with more than 200 international and 
national oil companies (IOCs and NOCs) (not including independents) in the world.  In 
2011, the top five producer countries were Saudi Arabia (11.15 million barrels/day), 
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Russia (10.24), United States (10.14), China (4.3), and Iran (4.2), with world production 
at 87.33 million barrels per day.  Amongst the twelve OPEC countries (which do not 
include Russia, U.S., and China) production was 35.12 million barrels/day or 40% of 
world production.  The data used in this study are based on actual produced quantities 
and production costs in 2010, where the literature most consistently finds the oil market 
to be “better” represented by the competitive model.  With the recent empirically 
competitive nature of the oil market in mind as a first approximation, this study assumes 
a competitive market (no market power) to develop the supply curve so that the marginal 
cost curve offers a reasonable approximation of the world supply curve.  Next, it is 
assumed price will equal an approximation of marginal costs (true marginal costs cannot 
be obtained as discussed in the methodology section).  Further, justifications of these 
assumptions are provided. 
3.3.3 Competitive Structure   
Further evidence to support the assumption of competitive structure is provided.  
Griffin (1985) finds evidence of OPEC being a cartel, but non-OPEC countries appear to 
be operating within a competitive model.  Ramcaharran (2002) using data from 1973-
1997 results support a competitive model for non-OPEC members and a target revenue 
model for OPEC.  He concludes, however, that “OPEC’s loss of market share and drop 
in the share of oil-based energy should signal adjustments in price and quantity based on 
a competitive world market for crude oil” (Ramcharran 2002, p. 97).  Almoguera et al 
(2011) find for the years 1974-2004 that both cooperative and non-cooperative behavior 
within OPEC has occurred.  They conclude Cournot competition in the face of a 
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competitive fringe is the best characterization over the entire period.  This market 
structure includes some features found in perfect competition, homogeneous product and 
firms do not cooperate, but firms have market power in that firm decisions affect price.  
Lin (2009) finds that there is evidence for OPEC collusion and a monopolistic structure 
to the world oil market from 1973-1981, but that perfect competition better explains 
demand in more recent history.  Holz and Huppmann (2012) also conclude the observed 
2008 and 2009 oil prices are close to the competitive benchmark prices.    
Colgan (2012) states the obvious, that many scholars and policymakers believe 
OPEC acts as a cartel that influences the world oil market by restricting oil production; 
however, he argues this view is wrong.  OPEC is economically dysfunctional and, 
instead of a powerful cartel effectively exercising monopolistic power, is better 
described as a political club that generates political benefits for its members.  Cairns and 
Calfucura (2012, p. 579) similarly suggests that countries gain political clout by joining 
OPEC and that 
“… playing the game consistently well would require organization, multinational 
operation for tankers and refineries, partners for joint ventures.  Once capacity is 
sunk, the players face capacity and geological constraints on their actions that 
can be overcome, if at all, only by other long-run actions.  Is it worth it in terms 
of their objectives?  They do not seem to play the game well.  OPEC does not 
control the agenda in oil; it reacts to the market.” 
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3.3.4 Dynamics and Scarcity Rent   
There are a number of reasons why the possibility for dynamic allocation of 
resources fails to create a significant departure from the static perfectly competitive 
framework.  Several reasons are provided.  Similar to market structure, studies that 
refute or confirm the dynamic nature and scarcity rent can be found.  But, as mentioned 
in the literature review, Hotelling’s original theory has repeatedly failed empirical tests 
when applied to oil production, because of a number of assumptions that may not apply 
to the world oil industry including costless storage and a fixed stock.  Adelman (1993) 
states “The Hotelling Rule and Hotelling Valuation Principle are thoroughly discredited.  
A valid theory was joined to a wrong premise, the fixed stock.  It gave results contrary to 
fact.”  Heaney and Grundy (2011) find no evidence to support Hoteling’s relationship 
between price net of extraction costs and the market value of crude oil.   
Another potential reason why scarcity rent may not be important in the empirical 
studies is because oil is drawn from a common pool.  The old open access adage of “use 
it or lose” may apply to oil reservoirs.  Oil storage (in-situ) is costly because of 
equipment rental costs whether or not production occurs, competition with other firms 
on the same reservoir (including common property aspects), and geologically dictated 
optimal extraction paths and flow rates.  Along these lines, Galanos (2012) applies the 
Hotelling Valuation Principle to data from six super major producers and finds they 
behave as though oil is worth nearly twice as much once extracted as it is in the ground 
as reserves.  Welfrens (2009) finds only weak evidence to support Hoteling’s rule in the 
world oil market. 
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3.3.5 Start-up and Shut Down Costs 
Startup and shutdown costs may also drive a wedge between the supply curve and 
the marginal cost curve.  If there are barriers to entry such as startup costs then market 
prices can remain above marginal costs without competitors entering the market.  Even 
if small profits are being made, new entrants are dissuaded by the barrier to entry of 
startup costs.  For oil production, especially new wells, startup costs clearly exist.  In the 
best-case scenario, when the existence of producible oil underground is a certainty, the 
well still needs to be drilled before it can be produced.  Producing wells also have the 
ability to temporarily cease and eventually resume production with associated costs. 
These costs have a tremendous range depending upon the type of well, location, and 
maturity.  Temporary shutdown costs for mature wells onshore could equate to the 
permanent loss of the remaining oil in the field (Wells, 2012). Offshore costs associated 
with temporary shutdown include at a minimum the day rates to rent the rig that would 
sit idle. These rates range from $50k/day to well of $400k/day (Rigzone, 2013).For the 
supply curve in this paper, costs are normalized to average lifecycle cost per barrel.  
Because of data limitation reasons, firms are assumed to make market entry decisions 
based upon the average cost, such that startup and shutdown costs are evenly distributed 
(or incurred) incrementally per barrel (a further discussion of this issue is presented in 
the methodology section).  This means that firms do consider startup and shutdown costs 
when making production decisions, but that they are not considered barriers to entry.  
Finally, each reservoir is not assumed to produce at full capacity, but is instead scaled so 
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that the aggregate production from all reservoirs within a country coincides with actual 
production by that country in 2010. 
3.3.6 Outcome of Assumptions 
The potential error of these assumptions would be the supply curve developed under 
competition would be to the right of the supply curve associated with the other market 
structures or price not equaling marginal costs, indicating that for any price, the 
competitive model would supply a higher quantity of oil than the other structures.  
Again, this is one of several competing theories regarding the correct form of the supply 
curve for oil.  After considering each theory, the applicability of their assumptions to oil 
production, and the literature’s review and empirical comparisons, the simplifying 
assumptions that give rise to a marginal cost supply curve appear appropriate for the oil 
market.   
3.4 Data 
Necessary data are crude oil production costs, reservoir characteristics, and 
production volumes.  Further, to map oil production to geopolitical regions, information 
on geological basins by regions is necessary.  Reservoir characteristics used to estimate 
onshore costs are recoverable reserves, oil density, depth, pressure, elevation, and 
dimensions (length x width).  For offshore costs, reservoir characteristics used are the 
same as onshore except that instead of elevation (which is invariant for offshore 
reservoirs) water depth is used.   
The above data, however, are readily available, especially the cost data.  To 
overcome this problem, a methodology similar to one that has successfully been used to 
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estimate production functions in agriculture is used (Dillon et al., 1989; Mjelde et al., 
1988; Boggess, 1984; Musser and Tew, 1984).  This methodology consists of 
summarizing output from large complex biophysical models using regression or other 
analyses to obtain production functions (Mjelde et al. 1988).  Instead of a biophysical 
simulation model, a physical / cost simulator, IHS Corporation’s Que$tor cost estimation 
software, provides the necessary data.  IHS (2012) notes “QUE$TOR™ is an industry-
leading software tool for capital and operating cost-estimation.  More than 500 oil and 
gas estimators and managers in 48 countries rely on this consistent, global platform for 
concept screening, concept optimization and cost control.”   
Que$tor is a proprietary software that references a large database with information 
on costs, reservoir characteristics, and production data for wells worldwide.  This 
database is used within Que$tor to construct detailed estimates of production costs for an 
inputted hypothetical well based on the reservoir characteristics, production plan, and 
capital requirements specified by the user.  For the purposes of this study, cost estimates 
are generated for every reservoir in Que$tor, both onshore and offshore.  A total of 411 
cost estimates (250 onshore and 161 offshore) are obtained for oil reservoirs around the 
world.  A summary of the number of well estimates generated by country and region is 
contained in Table 3.1.  If a reservoir spans multiple countries, lifetime cost and 
operating cost estimates are generated for each country. 
When generating a well estimate in Que$tor, the software requires the user to specify 
whether onshore or offshore, region, country, and reservoir.  After the reservoir has been 
specified the user can modify any of the default settings for the reservoir.  Default input 
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settings are used to generate consistent cost estimates, commensurate to an average well 
on the reservoir.  Default settings in Que$tor are not always true averages for production 
costs from a reservoir, but averages of historical production costs from the reservoir. 
This means that most default well estimates will be less expensive than a true average 
because, historically, cheaper oil is produced first.  The default, however, should still be 
a good approximation of current average production costs, although less accurate for 
future oil production from the reservoir. 
For offshore wells, Que$tor assumes a fixed default setting of 120 km from the well 
to the onshore operations base. Further, Que$tor does not account for “local content” 
requirements in their cost estimations.  “Local content” refers to the requirements of 
certain countries (namely Nigeria, Brazil, and Angola) that oil production must utilize 
local resources such as labor and equipment, which grants monopolistic powers to local 
suppliers and raises costs of production.  Fortunately, “local content” is only a factor in a 
few nations, and is a contrived element of regional production costs that would likely 
disappear if world prices for oil began to fall and production in those regions started to 
approach the break-even point.  Even with these issues in default settings, the 
constructed supply curve should represent current minimum costs of production for 
regional reservoirs as their costs near world price. 
For every reservoir estimate, Que$tor provides details on operating costs, total costs, 
lifespan of the well, and quantity produced by year and aggregate.  Que$tor also outputs 
lifecycle cost/barrel of oil equivalent (boe) and operating cost/boe.  These two measures 
are calculated by dividing the total lifecycle cost or total operating cost of the well from 
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the time of construction through decommission by the barrels of oil equivalent produced 
during the time frame.  Neither of these measures adjusts for inflation or discount rate; 
they are nominal representations of the ratio of cost to production quantities. 
Price and production levels from BP (2011) are used to calibrate the estimated 
supply curve to 2010 market clearing price and quantity.  Per capita GDP and population 
by country are from the CIA’s World Factbook (2012).  
3.5 Model 
To generate the supply curve, wells are ordered from the smallest lifetime cost per 
barrel of oil produced (total lifetime cost/total barrels produced) to the largest cost.  The 
average annual barrels of oil the well is expected to produce are aggregated across wells 
up to the reservoir level to form the supply curve.  Average annual production from a 
given well is considered that well’s marginal contribution to supply.  The average annual 
production from each well is believed to be a reasonable approximation because each 
reservoir has multiple wells operating at different stages along their lifetime production 
profiles. Some wells may be producing at, above, or below average, such that when 
aggregating to the reservoir level, assuming average production from each well is a 
reasonable approximation.  When the price increases above the lifetime cost per barrel of 
a well, the average annual production of that well is added to the supply curve.  If price 
is below the lifetime costs per barrel, that well does not contribute to supply.  The supply 
curve is composed of individual well production and costs, not aggregated production or 
costs by country.  Producing regions with multiple reservoirs, like the U.S., therefore, 
are represented by multiple wells along the supply curve. 
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The supply curve includes the marginal contribution of an average well from each 
world reservoir in Que$tor.  Reservoirs support multiple wells; therefore, if production 
from a reservoir is cost-feasible, many wells produce from the reservoir.  It is necessary 
to aggregate from a well to reservoir level production.  To accomplish this aggregation 
without good information on the number of producing wells per reservoir, the costs and 
production for each reservoir are scaled to coincide with each country’s reported 
production levels for 2010 (the most recent available world production data).   
Scaling the supply curve is a two part process that involves first truncating the data 
set to remove all wells with average operating costs that are higher than the average 
price of oil in 2010 (BP, 2011).  Average operating costs are used instead of average 
lifecycle costs to truncate the data because 2010 production and prices are a result of 
past prices and future price expectations.  Wells, therefore, may have been placed into 
production before 2010 because they were profitable given past prices or expected future 
prices.  In 2010, as long as operating costs are low enough they would remain in 
production even if the lifecycle cost exceeded the market price because the fixed startup 
costs had already been incurred.   
Second, the total reported production from each country is divided by the total 
production from all well estimates within that country.  The resulting quotient is the 
scaling factor by which each well’s production is multiplied within that country.  Each 
reservoir within a country then produces a different quantity of oil, even though each 
reservoir’s production within a country is scaled by the same factor.   
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For instances where oil producing countries were reported in BP (2011), but no cost 
estimates for those countries were available in Que$tor, production costs were 
approximated by equating them to nearby regions/countries that shared the same oil 
reservoirs.  For countries where a single reservoir provided the only source of oil and a 
nearby country had production cost estimates from the same reservoir, production costs 
for the unknown country were set equal to the costs of production from the shared 
reservoir, not the entire production profile of the neighboring country (this is the case for 
Qatar, Kuwait, and UAE, which produce all of their oil from the Iranian-Arabian 
Reservoir).  In no particular order, the countries that are approximated in this way are 
Azerbaijan, Equatorial Guinea, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Syria, Chad, and Sudan. 
Conversely, some countries had cost estimates in Que$tor, but did not have 
production listed in BP (2011).  In these instances, countries are categorized into regions 
of production in BP (2011) such as Other Africa, Other South and Central America, 
Other Europe and Eurasia, etc.  These categories record production quantities that were 
not attributed to individual countries.  Scaling is performed for each of these countries in 
a similar manner to countries that are directly attributed production.  The only difference 
in scaling for these countries is that all countries in a category are scaled by the same 
factor, instead of each country being scaled by its own unique factor.  To reiterate, each 
reservoir and country produces a different quantity of oil with a different lifecycle and 
operating cost; their average production is simply scaled by the same factor if part of the 
same region (e.g., South and Central America). 
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The constructed aggregate supply curve represents a depiction of the total quantity 
produced by region and the costs that each country faces in generating its total quantity 
of production.  In accordance with earlier discussion, this supply curve is ordinal and, 
therefore, a consistently appropriate model of reservoir and country supply, only if 
production costs are driven by innate reservoir characteristics.  To demonstrate the effect 
of reservoir characteristics on production costs a system of regression equations are 
estimated where production costs are explained by reservoir characteristics.  These 
equations could theoretically be used to estimate production costs for reservoirs and 
countries not available in Que$tor.  Unfortunately, no complete data sets were found 
regarding reservoir characteristics in any of these countries to allow for estimation, 
which is likely the reason that they were not available in Que$tor.  Nevertheless, these 
equations provide a framework to recover costs from any region once reservoir 
characteristics are known and help to substantiate the ordinal nature of the proposed 
supply curve.  
For the equations that follow, a well is a single producing platform or drill rig on a 
reservoir.  Firms face a cost function for each well in their portfolio.  The cost function 
depends on reservoir characteristics, equipment used, and production characteristics.  
Reservoir characteristics are exogenous because they are intrinsic to a region and are not 
caused by cost or production decisions.  Equipment choice and production volumes also 
depend upon reservoir characteristics.  The costs of oil production at a well, therefore, 
should be largely explained by reservoir characteristics even though costs depend on 
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other factors as well like equipment costs.  The cost model for oil production is 
composed of the following arguments: 
Lifetime Cost = f(Reservoir Characteristics, Production Characteristics, Equipment) 
where 
Production Characteristics = G(Reservoir Characteristics), and 
Equipment Choice = H(Reservoir Characteristics), 
This simplifies to lifetime costs for a well as represented by a reduced form function of 
reservoir characteristics alone: 
Lifetime Cost = Q(Reservoir Characteristics)                                                        (3.3) 
Similarly, 
Operating Cost = L(Reservoir Characteristics)                                                       (3.4) 
The above equations are estimated using seemingly unrelated regression (Zellner, 
1962).  Operating and lifetime costs are recoverable from reservoir characteristics alone, 
strengthening the premise of a supply curve constructed as the aggregate output of all 
cost-feasible individual wells (cost-feasible meaning that the market price of oil is higher 
than the lifetime cost per barrel).   
3.6 Scenarios 
Using the supply curve with 2010 market clearing price and quantity as the baseline, 
world demand is decreased by 2.5%, 5%, and 10% to create three scenarios of what 
might happen if world oil demand decreased in response to external factors.  Further, 
two different allocations of the decrease in world demand are modeled.  First, decreases 
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in U.S. demand are the same proportion as the decrease in world demand.  In essence, all 
countries’ demand is decreased by the same percentage.  Second, the entire world 
demand shift is attributed to a decrease in U.S. oil demand only.   
In 2010, the U.S. accounted for approximately 25% of world oil demand (BP, 2011).  
If U.S. demand were to account for the entire shift in the demand curve, a 2.5% world 
demand shift would result from a 10% U.S. demand shift (10% x 25% = 2.5%), whereas 
the 10% world demand shift would result from a 40% U.S. demand shift (40% x 25% = 
10%).  It is assumed that either world oil demand is vertical, or that the shift in demand 
is great enough for these scenarios such that a shift of 5% generates an equilibrium 
quantity demanded that is 5% lower.  These shifts have varying degrees of feasibility, 
but serve to demonstrate effects on world supply and regional political stability.   
In addition to changes in U.S. energy independence, changes in per capita GDP 
resulting from both oil price changes and local production changes are presented as a 
rough indicator of political stability for a country or region.  Per capita GDP is highly 
correlated with all major indices of political instability; therefore, a percentage reduction 
in per capita GDP is indicative of a reduction in political stability.   
3.7 Results 
 3.7.1 Regression Model 
Regression results depict the nature of the relationship between costs (both lifecycle 
and operating) and reservoir characteristics (Table 3.2).  With adjusted R² of 0.98 for 
onshore and 0.80 for offshore, the vast majority of well production costs and lifecycle 
costs are attributed to the reservoirs themselves, not the producing entity (reservoir 
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pressure and reserves are two of the most consistently significant contributors to cost).  
These results provide evidence that the world oil supply curve is ordinal with respect to 
each country’s position along the curve, although it should be noted that regressions are 
based on maintained assumptions within Que$tor.  Ordinality is necessary for any 
meaningful discussion of the reduction in each country’s production from demand shifts, 
or impacts on specific countries resulting from each scenario of reduced demand. 
3.7.2 Supply Curve  
As previously discussed, the supply curve is developed by plotting observations of 
cost and scaled quantity produced from wells worldwide (Figure 3.1).  By design, the 
supply curve itself is non-differentiable and only piecewise continuous because it is an 
aggregation of individual production points.  The structure of the oil supply curve can be 
inferred by observing the curvature.  The slope of the supply curve begins relatively flat, 
where small changes in price are accompanied by large changes in quantity supplied.  
Essentially, at lower quantities the supply curve is highly own-price elastic.  High price 
elasticity indicates that world oil price is relatively stable when the world quantities 
demanded and supplied, are relatively low.  Small changes in demand, however, would 
have a large impact on marginal producers who at any given time are near the breakeven 
price.  
Beginning at approximately $50/bbl, the supply curve rapidly changes toward a 
vertical curve; indicating a move toward an increasingly price inelastic supply curve.  
Own-price elasticity tends towards perfectly inelastic when all technologically possible 
oil sources are placed into production.   Volatile oil market prices are expected in this 
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portion of the supply curve because small changes in demand would have little impact 
upon quantities supplied, but large impacts on price.  Given the volatility of oil prices in 
the past decade or so and the fact that world oil prices have been above $50/bbl, provides 
some validity for the estimated supply curve. 
Supply price elasticity for oil is further corroborated by Considine (2006).  Their 
model, which also utilized a short run supply outlook with various scenarios imposed, 
found that the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) could effectively reduce prices 
by contributing to supply in the event of shocks.  The extreme inelasticity of the right 
hand side of the supply curve demonstrates why one may expect this kind of result in 
today’s oil market.  A very small change in quantity has a large impact on price.  To the 
left of the curve, which is much more price elastic, a release from the SPR would have 
less of an impact on price. 
Oil production by country in 2010 is compared to oil production obtained from the 
estimated supply curve in Table 3.3.  Total world oil production in 2010 of 30,464.36 
million bbls is less than 5% more than the “steady” world oil production obtained from 
the derived supply curve at the 2010 price (29,099.46 million bbls).  Of the 85 countries 
modeled, 69 or 81% have a difference in production of less than 20% with 60 or 71% 
having a difference of less than 5%.  Of those countries with more than 1% of the total 
world production (25 countries that account for 88% of total world production), only 
Angola’s production difference is larger than 3.7%.  The reason Angola has such a large 
deviation between actual 2010 production and supply curve production is that although 
Angola’s average operating cost/boe is relatively low at $37.63, it has relatively high 
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lifetime cost/boe at $100.68.  Therefore, with 2010 oil prices being greater than $73/bbl, 
production costs are met and any production activity in Angola from previous years 
would continue.  Lifecycle costs, however, are above world price, causing production to 
fall and new investment to cease if world prices were to remain around $73/bbl.  The 
drivers for its high lifecycle costs likely stem from equipment requirements for 
extracting oil at more than twice the water depth of the average offshore reservoir and 
the relatively few recoverable barrels (Angola’s reserves are less than 10% of the 
average reservoir).   
3.7.2.1 Changes in World Oil Production as Demand Decreases 
As expected, given the different costs structures of the reservoirs, decreases in world 
oil demand will affect countries differently (Table 3.3).  At one extreme, Saudi Arabian 
production is unaffected by a decrease in demand; production does not decrease even 
with a 10% decrease in world oil demand.  The United Kingdom, on the other hand, 
experiences a 12% decrease in production with a 2.5% decrease in demand and a 45% 
decrease in production if demand decreases by 10%. 
Many of the marginal producing countries experience a 100% decrease in 
production.  At the 2010 price of $73/bbl, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Spain, Barbados, 
Tajikistan, Czech Republic, and Poland will eventually stop investing and cease 
production.  A 2.5% reduction in demand leads to the countries of Angola, Afghanistan, 
Philippines, Latvia, and Mongolia ceasing production activities.  When demand 
decreases by 5%, additional countries of Demark, Japan, Taiwan, Cambodia, Myanmar, 
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Bolivia, and Guatemala cease production.  Finally, with a 10% decrease Italy, Tunisia, 
South Korea, Chile, Ireland, France, Netherlands, and Croatia also cease production. 
3.7.2.2. Impact on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Stability  
Aside from the challenge and feasibility of reducing oil demand, there is the question 
of impact on other oil producing countries from a demand shift.  The slope of the supply 
curve has an impact on country revenues regardless of where along the curve they fall.  
There are two factors affecting a country’s revenue from oil when world demand shifts.  
The most obvious factor relates to the position of that country’s wells/reservoirs along 
the supply curve.  If demand shifts to the left and intersects the supply curve at a price 
lower than the lifetime cost per barrel for one or more wells within a country, production 
will cease from those wells.  All revenue from those wells, therefore, will be lost.  
A downward shift in the world demand curve also puts downward pressure on the 
price, especially in the highly inelastic portion to the right of the supply curve.  This is 
the second factor that reduces a country’s oil revenues, the loss of revenue from still 
producing wells due to the lower price of oil resulting from a downward shift in demand.  
The potential change in production for every producing country under each scenario of a 
downward demand shift and the market-clearing price that results from the shift is 
presented in Table 3.3.   
Displayed in Table 3.4 is the change in per capita GDP by country that would result 
from each demand shift.  These estimates assume a change in GDP from only lost oil 
revenues ceteris parabis.  Countries with the largest decrease in per capita GDP are also 
the countries whose oil revenues account for the majority of their GDP.  Afghanistan is 
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at the top of the list and would experience nearly an 84% reduction in per capita GDP 
from only a 10% decrease in world oil demand.  This would lower Afghanistan’s per 
capita GDP from an already meager $1,000 USD to roughly $162 USD, making a 
politically unstable country even more unstable.  
Oil revenue has the potential to affect political instability because it affects per capita 
GDP, which is highly correlated with every measure of political instability (Marshall, 
2008).  To roughly examine how stability may be impacted on average, ViewsWire 
(2007) instability index was regressed as a function of the per capita GDP in 2007 for all 
165 countries listed in ViewsWire (2007).  The log of the instability index is regressed 
on the log of per capita GDP yields a coefficient of -0.14, which is significant at the 1% 
level.  A simple interpretation is a 1% decrease in per capita GDP increases the 
instability index (more unstable) by 0.14%. 
Politically unstable oil exporting countries pose a threat to the industrialized world 
through supply outages (tactical or otherwise).  The other side of the coin is that if 
politically unstable countries produce the majority of the world’s oil, they will be 
amongst the most affected by demand shifts.  Even if the oil that such countries produce 
is the lowest cost, they will suffer revenue losses from the lower market price of oil that 
accompanies a demand shift.   
3.7.2.3. U.S. Demand Changes and Oil Independence 
The above results are independent of the source of the reduction in world demand for 
oil.  Here, two scenarios of the source are examined in relationship to U.S. production 
and consumption.  The first scenario assumes the shift in world oil demand is shared 
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equally among all consuming nations; therefore, the U.S. demand shift is proportional to 
the total demand shift.  The second scenario assumes the entire shift in world oil demand 
is caused only by a change in U.S. oil demand.   
In Table 3.5, the percentage change in the ratio of U.S. production to total 
consumption is displayed for every demand shift scenario (energy independence 
measure).  When the demand shift is proportional, a 2.5% reduction in demand improves 
U.S. energy independence by 2.56%; whereas, a 5% reduction in demand does less to 
improve U.S. energy independence with improvement of only 1.46%.  A 10% reduction 
in demand leads to a 3.37% improvement in energy independent.  This result is 
attributable to the dispersion of U.S. reservoirs along the supply curve.  The U.S. 
produced over 2.7 billion bbls of oil in 2010; the majority of those barrels coming from 
relatively low cost reservoirs in Alaska.  Yet, some of the U.S. oil reservoirs are more 
costly, including reservoirs in California and the Gulf of Mexico, which begin to drop 
out of production when world demand decreases by 5% or 10%, regardless of the source 
of the decrease.  
When U.S. demand reductions account for the entire shift (All U.S. in Table 3.5), as 
expected the change in energy independence is greater than the proportional scenario.  A 
2.5% shift in world demand coming only from the U.S. would mean a 10% shift in U.S. 
demand, because U.S. demand is approximately 25% of world demand (10% x 25% = 
2.5%).  Under this scenario, the percentage change in energy independence is 11%.  The 
more drastic change of a 10% world reduction caused by a 40% decrease in U.S demand 
leads to a 55% increase in energy independence.  Inferences from Table 3.5 question the 
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soundness of the energy independence arguments.  In the absence of game changing 
technologies, achieving self-sufficiency from demand side management is not 
meaningful. 
Yet, there is still another side to the argument for energy independence that must also 
be considered.  Aside from the challenge and feasibility of reducing U.S. oil demand; 
there is the previously discussed impact of the reduction on other oil producing 
countries.  One potential cost of the U.S. increasing its oil self-sufficiency is the 
potential increased political destabilization in some producing countries.  Trade-offs 
between improving the U.S. national security position through increased self-sufficiency 
and political destabilization appear to be real, although rarely discussed when the issue 
of self-sufficiency is discussed in the political and media arenas.    
3.8 Discussion 
The near verticality of the right hand side of the supply curve is indicative of the 
infeasibility and potential ramifications of the oil independence argument.  Highly 
inelastic supply will cause demand shifts to have a much larger effect on price than on 
quantity.  It, therefore, would take a large demand shift to bring about a relatively small 
change in quantity supplied.  For the U.S. to become more energy independent, a higher 
percentage of its demand must be met by domestic production. 
Improving U.S. oil independence requires consuming not only less oil from foreign 
producing countries, but less in proportion to the amount produced domestically.  
Demand reduction alone, therefore, does not guarantee improved independence because 
it does not necessarily reduce the ratio of imported oil.  To improve oil independence the 
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ratio of domestic production to domestic consumption must increase.  Oil independence 
is only achieved through a demand shift if the fall in domestic consumption is not 
matched by a proportional fall in domestic production. That is, the domestic sources 
must continue producing at pre-shift levels, or mitigate production to a lesser extent than 
foreign producers mitigate.   
As the results show, the only way to improve U.S. energy independence by more 
than 3%-4% is for a major reduction in U.S. demand.  There are only two foreseeable 
ways that such a major demand shift could occur; either a technological advance or 
government energy policy.  A technological advance capable of greatly reducing oil 
demand, however, would also be adopted by much of the rest of the world, drastically 
lowering world demand.  This would not only hurt U.S. revenue, but also cripple the 
economies of many of the world’s politically unstable oil producing and exporting 
countries in the process. 
This type of result is expected, but an unintended consequence of the policy.  In an 
effort to depend less upon politically unstable countries for oil production, the U.S. may, 
ironically, bring about an increase in the instability of countries it imports oil from, to a 
disproportionately large degree than it lessens its dependence upon those countries.  Two 
factors are at play and inextricably linked: the percentage of domestic oil demand 
satisfied by foreign imports, and the political stability of the countries from which oil is 
imported.  These factors are inversely related such that reducing U.S. demand and the 
quantity of oil purchased from abroad, increases foreign instability.  Further, U.S. 
demand reduction lowers U.S. oil revenues and U.S. GDP. Therefore, unless 
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considerable preference is given to reduction of oil imported from abroad as opposed to 
stability of oil supplying nations and impact on U.S. GDP, any policy curtailing U.S. oil 
demand will have a net negative impact on the U.S.  
Beyond the plight of U.S. energy independence, the results demonstrate that even 
small changes to world oil demand, regardless of the source, have impacts all over the 
world.  Reductions in demand for oil have been sought worldwide as beneficial to the 
environment and domestic self-sufficiency.  In light of the extreme inelasticity of 
portions of the supply curve, the variance in oil production as a percentage of GDP, and 
variance in regional reservoir costs, many producing countries are susceptible to major 
economic impacts from oil policies of others.  Few oil producing countries are insulated 
from these impacts, and even those that are, like the U.S., are still adversely affected. 
An implication is that all oil policies, regardless of the intended benefit, must be 
weighed against these lesser-considered ramifications.  No country’s protectionist or 
reductionist policies for oil affect only that country.  Producing countries all benefit from 
global emissions reductions, but are also damaged, and to differing degrees, by demand 
reductions. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INTERSECTION OF U.S. SUPPLY AND DEMAND CURVES 
  
World oil prices and market clearing quantities arise from the intersection of the 
world excess supply and demand curves for oil.  Both curves represent an aggregation of 
all countries participating in the world market.  Countries such as the U.S. with excess 
demand import oil at the world price.  If the U.S. were to achieve energy independence 
in oil (zero imports), the U.S. supply and demand curves would determine the U.S. 
market price if this price is either below the world price or regulations ban all imports.  
Not only is the intersection important, but the slopes of the curves at the intersection, 
because they indicate the potential effects of shifts in demand and/or supply.   
Strategic imports such as oil have an economic cost associated with them, which is 
not reflected in the market price.  This cost is associated with national security, which 
has the characteristics of being a public good.  Public goods are goods whose 
consumption is indivisible.  Indivisible consumption is consumption that is nonrival and 
nonexcludable.  This additional cost of national security is referred to as a vulnerability 
premium.  As illustrated in the theory section, this vulnerability premium needs to be 
added to the world price to determine if the U.S. should be self-sufficient or energy 
independent (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2008).  If the world price plus the vulnerability 
premium is more than the equilibrium price of the U.S. without imports then economic 
theory suggests the U.S. should be self-sufficient.  If the premium plus world price is 
less than the U.S. autarky price, the U.S. is better off importing oil and not being self-
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sufficient.  Both the vulnerability premium and U.S. equilibrium price without imports 
determine whether the U.S. should be self-sufficient.   
4.1 Objective 
Providing information on the U.S. equilibrium price to help determine if the U.S. 
should be self-sufficient is the objective of this chapter.  Once the U.S. equilibrium price 
is determined, economic inferences on the size of the vulnerability premium necessary 
for the U.S. to self-sufficient are presented.  To accomplish this objective, the U.S. 
demand curve that is estimated in Chapter II is overlaid with a U.S. supply curve from 
Chapter III.   
4.2 Simple Economic Theory of the Oil Vulnerability Premium  
Consider the U.S. supply and demand curves for oil as represented by the domestic 
supply and domestic demand curves in Figure 4.1.  In a state of autarky, the U.S. would 
achieve equilibrium at the intersection of these two curves, with corresponding price and 
quantity of P₃ and Q₃.  When the U.S. is involved in international trade for oil, the world 
oil supply curve is introduced.  For simplicity, assume the world price is fixed at P0.  At 
this price, the U.S. quantity supplied would be Q0 and quantity demanded Q2.  The 
difference between Q2 and Q0 is the amount of oil imported.    
Allowing for trade lowers the price and improves domestic consumer surplus 
compared to the autarky equilibrium.  As previously discussed, trade also exposes the 
U.S. to national security concerns.  This exposure can be seen by considering an 
embargo.  If the U.S. were engaging in free trade for oil at a price of P0, an embargo 
would cause an immediate shift in domestic oil consumption to a short-run price that is 
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much higher (P2) and a quantity that is much lower (Q0) than the autarky equilibrium.  
This is the risk the U.S. becomes exposed to when engaged in free trade; a cost to 
national security that is not reflected in the market price (P0). 
If national security costs are considered, a vulnerability premium would be added to 
the world price giving an effective market price of P1.  At a price of P1, the U.S. 
consumes less oil and produces more domestically than would be the case under free 
trade.  Consumer surplus is higher than it would be under autarky and the U.S. is better 
protected from an embargo than with free trade.  In this case, the impact of the embargo 
is much less as the short-run price goes to P4 and quantity consumed is Q1.  For the case 
depicted in figure 4.1, self-sufficiency in oil (the autarky equilibrium) is not merited 
because even with the vulnerability premium the price of oil plus the premium is less 
than the equilibrium price under autarky.  This is most likely the case because of the 
small probability of a complete embargo.  Only in the case of the premium plus world 
price being larger than the U.S. autarky equilibrium price is self-sufficiency warranted. 
Several studies have examined the vulnerability premium associated with U.S. oil 
imports, how to mitigate national security concerns associated with free trade, and 
whether the U.S. should strive towards self-sufficiency in oil.  Broadman (1986) 
explains the interrelated components of the social costs (which he terms the demand 
component and the disruption component) that need to be considered when empirically 
estimating the U.S. oil vulnerability premium.  He surveys 18 studies that attempt to 
estimate this premium.  Premiums from these 18 studies range from $2 to $124 per bbl 
with an average of $27.  The wide range of estimates is attributed to the large number of 
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assumptions that are involved in achieving such an estimate, and to common weaknesses 
in every approach.  The biggest weakness in each approach stems from poor treatment of 
supply and demand elasticities.  Broadman (1986) does not explicitly calculate a 
vulnerability premium, but suggests the best policy tool for reducing U.S. vulnerability 
from foreign oil imports is to place a tariff on foreign oil to increase U.S. supplies and to 
add to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to subsidize domestic supply in the event 
of foreign disruptions. 
More recent studies exist, but suffer from similar assumptions and inadequate 
treatment of supply and demand as those surveyed by Broadman (1986). Brown and 
Huntington (2010), for instance make a number of assumptions about future price points, 
and foreign oil disruption risks, while utilizing in their calculations average demand and 
supply elasticities from the literature.  They calculate a vulnerability premium of 
$4.89/bbl.  Leiby (2007) constructs an equation to calculate the U.S. oil vulnerability 
premium, but does not evaluate this equation to generate a numerical result. A common, 
yet significant flaw in all of these studies is the assumption that the supply curve is 
continuous at the average point elasticity.  That is, they assume not only that point 
elasticities approximate elasticities at other points along the supply curve, but that the 
domestic quantity supplied is increasing with price throughout the ranges they analyze.   
4.3 U.S. Oil Supply and Demand 
The U.S. demand curve is generated using the LA/GAI estimates from Chapter II by 
setting the prices and quantities of all other commodities in the demand system (natural 
gas, coal, and electricity) to their 2008 levels (the most recent data available for 
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electricity prices and quantities used for the demand model).  The supply curve for the 
U.S. is generated in a similar fashion to the world supply curve in Chapter III.  As in 
Chapter III, all individual well estimates are aggregated and scaled to coincide with U.S. 
oil production in 2010 (BP, 2011).  In 2010, U.S. oil production in was 2.7 billion 
bbls/yr, and the price for a barrel of oil was greater than $70/bbl.  The highest estimated 
lifecycle cost per barrel for the U.S. in Que$tor was less than $70/bbl.  All known and 
estimable U.S. oil resources, therefore, were in production and contributing to the U.S. 
supply curve in 2010 that cumulatively produced 2.7 billion bbls/yr.  Both the supply 
and demand curves are plotted in Figure 4.2.  
4.4 Discussion 
It is immediately apparent in Figure 4.2 that there is no intersection between the U.S. 
supply and demand curves, and one can easily see why.  At an oil price of $70/bbl or 
higher, the U.S. is producing oil from all the reservoirs whose cost and production 
profiles are estimable within Que$tor.  Total production peaks at 2.7 billion bbls/yr, 
while the quantity of oil consumed by the U.S. is 6.8 billion bbls/yr.  For the U.S. supply 
curve to intersect the U.S. demand curve, even at the contract quantity of 5.6 billion 
bbls/yr, the U.S. would have to more than double annual production.  
The supply and demand curves are calculated for different years (the demand curve 
for 2008 and the supply curve for 2010).  This does generate some incompatibility. This 
limitation, however, does not detract from the main result, but rather strengthens the 
inference.   Oil supply has historically expanded in terms of recoverable quantities (BP, 
2011), such that a 2010 supply curve should actually stretch farther to the right than a 
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2008 curve.  This has historically proved true for the U.S. with 8.7% higher reserves in 
2010 compared to 2008, even though prices were higher in 2008.  The 2008 average 
world price was over $91/bbl, whereas, the 2010 price was a little over $73/bbl 
(McMahon, 2013). 
The theory of oil vulnerability premiums implies that if the true social cost (world 
price plus vulnerability premium) is above the autarky equilibrium price then a country 
should be self-sufficient in oil. The U.S. domestic short run supply and demand curves, 
however, do not intersect to form an equilibrium price.  The vulnerability premium, then, 
would have to be infinite to argue that it would be socially optimal for the U.S. to be 
self-sufficient in oil.  Even the highest vulnerability premium reported in previous 
studies of $124/bbl, does not come close to approaching the infinite level required.  
Further, because the quantity of oil the U.S. supplies is limited not by price in the current 
market, but by physical and technological limitations, the tariffs which Broadman (1986) 
suggests will improve domestic production, will instead only transfer consumer surplus 
to domestic suppliers and the government. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
  
Oil is the most heavily consumed energy commodity in the U.S. and throughout the 
rest of the world.  As a result, there has been a preponderance of literature in economics 
aimed at modeling the industry, demand, competition, and supply.  On the supply side, 
the literature has explored deeply into optimal extraction paths for oil.  Also, many 
studies have estimated future aggregate oil production using time series regression 
models.  
On the demand side, many papers have utilized reduced form estimation techniques 
to estimate demand for oil and/or other commodities such as natural gas.  These studies 
are wide ranging in terms of the number of commodities included and the localization of 
demand to a region.  Fewer studies have used structural form equations, such as the 
Almost Ideal, to estimate demand for oil as a system of demands for energy 
commodities.  
This dissertation adds to the above literature by addressing three issues.  Demand for 
oil and energy commodities in the United States is estimated using structural demand 
models that incorporate contract or pre-commitment levels.  Previous studies have not 
explicitly addressed contract levels and the changes their inclusion makes to elasticity 
estimates, which then impact the efficacy of policy.  Second, a world oil supply curve is  
constructed that allows for comparison of regional costs and for insight into changes in 
world supply balances.  Unintended outcomes of policies or technological advances that 
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reduce oil demand are examined using this model.  Finally, the U.S. supply and demand 
curves are compared to address the issue of the U.S. becoming “energy independent” in 
oil.    
The demand model estimates a contract level for oil that is nearly three times larger 
than the U.S. domestic oil supply.  This contract level would indicate that in the short 
run, there are no price adjustments that could move the U.S. market anywhere near self-
sufficiency in oil.  Moreover, cross price elasticities from the demand model suggest that 
attempts at oil price adjustments would also affect demand for natural gas, electricity, 
and coal. 
The world oil supply model suggests that a small decrease in demand of 
approximately 2.5% can generate an equivalent percentage improvement in U.S. “energy 
independence” in oil.  Such changes, however, have potential other costs including 
increased political instability in producing countries and lost U.S. revenue from oil 
production.  Further, it appears the vulnerability premium associated with oil imports 
would have to be infinite for the justification of self-sufficiency in the U.S. oil market.    
In the absence of a major change in technology or preferences, it appears no reasonable 
demand side policies will culminate in the U.S. being self-sufficient in oil.  
Other conclusions drawn from these models suggest that energy is a much more 
complicated and interconnected system than we often take it to be with wide ranging 
complications all over the world to any perturbation. To demonstrate these points, the 
elasticities from the demand model and implications from the supply model are 
combined, to make inference into the feasibility and net impact of shifts in oil demand.  
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Each barrel (42 gallons) of oil is capable of generating 44 gallons of gasoline.  The 
reason 42 gallons of crude oil creates 44 gallons of gasoline is that during refining only 
19.5 gallons from each barrel of crude goes towards the production of gasoline, but 24.5 
gallons of other additives are introduced to create the final product (this is referred to as 
Refinery Processing Gain (EIA, 2012)).  In 2010, the U.S. consumed 3,307 mbbls/yr of 
gasoline and 6,989 mbbls/yr of oil; creating an oil to gasoline consumption ratio of 
2.11:1.  Only about half of the demand for oil, therefore, is attributable to demand for 
gasoline.  It is reasonable, then, to assume that a 2% reduction in gasoline demand would 
cause a 1% reduction in oil demand.  
From Chapter III, the only scenario is which the improvement in U.S. energy 
independence (2.56%) is greater than the reduction in demand is the 2.5% reduction in 
oil consumption scenario.  For this scenario to arise from a change in CAFÉ standards, 
gasoline demand would need to fall by twice that amount or roughly five percent.  The 
change from targeting oil demand directly, to targeting oil demand through gasoline 
demand affects the efficacy of the policy.  If oil demand is targeted directly, oil demand 
is reduced by less than the consequential improvement in energy independence.  If oil 
demand is targeted through policies on gasoline demand, the gasoline demand reduction 
must be twice the consequential improvement in energy independence.  From Table 3.3, 
a 2.5% drop in oil demand causes the equilibrium price of oil to fall by more than 30%.  
Cross price elasticities from Chapter II suggest that the demand for natural gas and 
electricity will increase by 6.6% and 18.6%, while demand for coal will fall by 2.4%.  
U.S. GDP would also fall by approximately 0.36% ($55.4 billion).  
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From an economic and environmental standpoint, the outcome from targeting 
gasoline demand could actually be considered a positive, which under this scenario, 
speaks to the potential of small improvements in energy independence being not only 
feasible, but also effective in a number of different ways including reducing pollution 
(EIA, 1998).  With a 5% reduction in gasoline demand, energy independence would 
improve and consumption of less polluting commodities would be increased to take up 
the slack in demand, namely natural gas and electricity.  Use of coal also decreases.  
The conclusion is that small percentage decreases in oil demand can generate similar, 
or larger percentage improvements in “energy independence”. Also, the reduction in oil 
consumption is accompanied by a reduction in coal consumption as the two are 
compliments.  If the true objective of “energy independence” in oil, therefore, is to 
improve the economic welfare of the U.S. and does not include ramifications to other oil 
producing countries, then small changes in gasoline or oil demand through policies or 
technological changes could be beneficial.  Larger changes of 5%-10% are actually 
counterproductive in terms of energy independence and U.S. GDP, but may improve 
pollution because of less oil being consumed and also less coal.  Therefore, small 
improvements in energy independence can be made through small reductions in oil 
demand.  Large changes in energy independence do not appear to be feasibly achieved 
through technological change or policies that reduce oil or especially gasoline demand.  
When the ramifications estimated here are considered, no demand side reductions 
generate a clear net benefit for the U.S., unless the stability of foreign oil suppliers is 
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immaterial. “The key lesson from all of this is that we need to broaden our horizons 
when thinking about oil policy. We are all in this tub together” (Nordhaus, 2009 p. 13). 
5.1 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
U.S. oil demand is estimated in a demand system that considers three other energy 
commodities, coal, natural gas, and electricity.  Data concerning other commodities in 
the energy system such as biofuels and nuclear power, is limited.  Including these other 
commodities would make an interesting study of cross price elasticities between these 
additional commodities and the ones included here. The inclusion of new commodities 
would require additional years of observations as well.  Additionally, estimating an oil 
and energy structural demand system with contract levels for the entire world could be 
informative.  Modeling such a system, which includes widely traded commodities such 
as oil, and commodities with limited international trade, such as electricity, would prove 
challenging.   
A world oil supply curve is generated using world oil production statistics and 
reservoir costs.  This supply curve does not include national fiscal terms as contributing 
to costs.  Fiscal terms in oil and gas refer to the nationalistic policies and tax structures 
that affect the cost of producing oil.  Without the inclusion of fiscal terms, the supply 
curve reflects that actual intrinsic cost of producing oil from each reservoir.  Fiscal terms 
are assumed to be non-binding as world prices approach a country’s actual cost of 
production.  That is, if prices fall and a country is faced with the choice between 
producing no oil or relaxing fiscal terms, it is assumed that countries will relax or 
eliminate their fiscal terms.  The supply curve in this study, therefore, should represent 
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the price points and quantities that consumers face.  Fiscal terms, however, do affect the 
profitability of producers from reservoirs that are below the equilibrium price.  A 
compelling further study would be to add the additional costs of fiscal terms to each 
reservoir and examine how these fiscal terms re-order the costs of reservoirs.  
In this dissertation supply and demand were estimated separately using different 
techniques.  Another approach that would provide an intriguing comparison is to 
estimate supply and demand together as a system.   
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APPENDIX I 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 2.1 – Energy Commodity System Parameter Estimates Using LA/GAIDS and LA/AIDS. 
Commodity  Parameter 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Commodity Parameter 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
LA/GAIDS 
Oil c1 5.690 0.081 Natural Gas c₂ 3.657 0.133 
α1*** 0.283 0.047  α₂ -0.082 0.092 
β₁ 0.017 0.020 β₂*** 0.149 0.042 
γ₁₁*** 0.118 0.013 γ₂₁ -0.017 0.013 
γ₁₂ -0.0171 0.013 γ₂₂ -0.001 0.033 
γ₁₃ -0.004 0.018 γ₂₃ 0.020 0.033 
γ₁₄*** -0.097 0.016 γ₂₄ -0.002 0.025 
Coal c₃ 3.274 0.0568 Electricity c₄ 1.440 0.018 
α₃*** 0.557 0.083 α₄*** 0.242 0.057 
β₃*** -0.159 0.050 β₄ -0.008 0.031 
γ₃₁ -0.004 0.018 γ₄₁*** -0.097 0.016 
γ₃₂ 0.020 0.033 γ₄₂ -0.002 0.025 
γ₃₃ 0.049 0.064 γ₄₃ -0.066 0.048 
γ₃₄ -0.066 0.048 γ₄₄*** 0.165 0.042 
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Table 2.1 Continued 
Commodity  Parameter 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Commodity Parameter 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
LA/AIDS 
Oil α₁*** 0.421 0.067 Natural Gas α2 0.004 0.041 
 β₁ -0.018 0.024  β₂*** 0.092 0.014 
 γ11*** 0.144 0.007  γ21*** -0.033 0.005 
 γ12*** -0.033 0.005  γ22*** 0.096 0.008 
 γ13*** -0.029 0.011  γ23** -0.018 0.008 
 γ14*** -0.082 0.007  γ24*** -0.046 0.010 
Coal α3*** 0.693 0.107 Electricity α4* -0.118 0.067 
 β₃*** -0.119 0.039  β₄** 0.045 0.023 
 γ31*** -0.029 0.011  γ41*** -0.082 0.007 
 γ32** -0.018 0.008  γ42*** -0.046 0.010 
 γ33*** 0.183 0.020  γ43*** -0.136 0.013 
 γ34*** -0.136 0.013  γ44*** 0.264 0.016 
*, **, and *** indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level. 
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Table 2.2 - Cross Price Elasticities for Both LA/GAI and LA/AI. 
Oil  Natural Gas Coal Electricity 
G
en
er
al
iz
ed
 
Oil -0.3041*** -0.1235 -0.0505 -0.6257*** 
(0.095) (0.091) (0.090) (0.098) 
Natural Gas -0.2218** -1.1534*** -0.1169 -0.3002** 
(0.089) (0.208) (0.140) (0.140) 
Coal 0.0801 0.1768 -0.6682*** -0.0291 
(0.081) (0.140) (0.193) (0.202) 
Electricity -0.2636*** -0.0026 -0.174 -0.5376*** 
(0.051) (0.077) (0.112) (0.131) 
A
lm
os
t I
de
al
 
Oil -0.1089* -0.1781*** -0.1452*** -0.4602*** 
(0.065) (0.050) (0.037) (0.075) 
Natural Gas -0.2541*** -0.5795*** -0.2333*** -0.4197*** 
(0.035) (0.048) (0.036) (0.056) 
Coal -0.033 0.0158 -0.2375*** -0.3257*** 
(0.060) (0.044) (0.039) (0.081) 
Electricity -0.2473*** -0.1493*** -0.4186*** -0.3192*** 
(0.028) (0.032) (0.030) (0.048) 
Note: the number at the intersection of two commodities represents the cross price  
elasticity for the commodity on the left resulting from a price change in the commodity 
given by the column headings.  Diagonal elements give own price elasticities.  Standard 
errors are in parenthesis below the elasticity value. All elasticities are calculated at the 
average prices and quantities over the observed timeframe. (*), (**), and (***) indicates 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 2.3 - Wealth Elasticities for Both LA/GAI and 
LA/AI. 
Commodity Wealth Elasticity Std. Err.
G
en
er
al
iz
ed
 
Oil 1.1038*** 0.123
Natural Gas 1.7923*** 0.225
Coal 0.4403*** 0.176
Electricity 0.9795*** 0.085
A
lm
os
t I
de
al
 
Oil 0.8924*** 0.146
Natural Gas 1.4866*** 0.074
Coal 0.5804*** 0.138
Electricity 1.1244*** 0.063
Note: (*), (**), and (***) indicates statistical significance at  
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 2.4 - Contract Levels as a Percentage of Average Quantity Demanded 
Commodity Average Contract Contract Percentage 
Oil 6.563 5.690 87% 
Natural Gas 4.216 3.656 87% 
Coal 4.425 3.274 74% 
Electricity 2.107 1.440 68% 
Note: All units are billion barrel of oil equivalent (boe). The "Average" 
column displays the average quantity demanded for the respective 
commodities over the observed time frame. The “Contract” column is the 
endogenously estimated contract level. The “Contract Percentage” is the 
contract level as a percentage of average quantity demanded. 
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Table 2.5 – Akaiki and Bayesian Loss Metrics for Both LA/GAI and LA/AI. 
Model Observations Log likelihood DF AIC BIC 
LA/GAI 28 795.54 16 -1559.07 -1537.76 
LA/AI 28 758.98 12 -1493.96 -1447.97 
Note: The AIC (BIC) column contains the value of the Akaiki (Bayesian) Information 
Criteria for the specified model 
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Table 2.6 - R² and RMSE for Each Commodity Equation Estimated Using Both 
LA/AI and LA/GAI. 
  LA/AI  LA/GAI 
Commodity R² RMSE R² RMSE 
Oil 0.9806 0.00833 0.9994 0.00437 
Natural Gas 0.9725 0.008059 0.9994 0.004693 
Coal 0.9946 0.005517 0.9997 0.005139 
Electricity 0.9828 0.006515  0.9999 0.004313 
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Table 3.1 – Reservoirs in Que$tor
Region Country Onshore Offshore Total Region Country Onsh Offshore Total
Africa 
Algeria 1 0 1
Far East 
Afghanistan 1 0 1
Angola 1 1 2 Bahngladesh 1 1 2
Congo 1 1 2 Brunei 1 1 2
Egypt 2 2 4 Cambodia 0 1 1
Gabon 1 1 2 China 27 5 32
Libya 2 0 2 India 8 7 15
Madegascar 1 1 2 Indonesia 16 24 40
Nigeria 1 1 2 Japan 11 5 16
Tunisia 1 1 2 Malaysia 0 1 1
    Subtotal 11 8 19 Mongolia 1 0 1
Australia Australia 3 3 6 Myanmar 3 3 6
CIS 
    Subtotal 3 3 6 North Korea 0 1 1
Kazakhstan 2 0 2 Pakistan 0 1 1
Moldova 2 0 2 Philippines 5 1 6
Russia 5 7 12 South Korea 0 1 1
Tajikistan 1 0 1 Taiwan 2 2 4
Turkmenistan 1 0 1 Thailand 6 0 6
Ukraine 6 0 6 Vietnam 1 0 1
Europe 
     Subtotal 17 7 24
Latin 
America 
     Subtotal 83 54 137
Uzbekistan 1 0 1 Argentina 5 3 8
Albania 1 0 1 Barbados 1 0 1
Bosnia-Herzegov 1 0 1 Bolivia 3 0 3
Bulgeria 4 0 4 Brazil 11 14 25
Croatia 1 0 1 Chile 2 1 3
Czech Republic 1 0 1 Columbia 8 2 10
Denmark 1 0 1 Cuba 2 2 4
Faroe Islands 0 1 1 Ecuador 3 1 4
France 7 1 8 Guatemala 1 0 1
Germany 4 2 6 Guyana 1 0 1
Greece 2 2 4 Mexico 10 4 14
Hungary 1 0 1 Nicaragua 0 1 1
Ireland 1 4 5 Peru 6 2 8
Italy 8 7 15 Suriname 1 0 1
Latvia 0 1 1 Trinidad and Tobago 1 2 3
Macedonia 1 0 1      Subtotal 55 32 87
Malta 1 0 1  Venezuela 5 4 9Netherlands 1 0 1 Bahrain 1 0 1
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Table 3.1 Continued Middle 
East Norway 0 3 3 Iran 4 2 6
Poland 1 0 1 Iraq 1 0 1
Portugal 1 1 2 Israel 3 1 4
Romania 3 0 3 Oman 1 0 1
Serbia and Montenegro 1 0 1 Saudi Arabia 1 1 2
Spain 4 5 9 Turkey 4 2 6
United Kingdom 5 8 13 Yemen 3 1 4
     Subtotal 51 35 86      Subtotal 23 11 34
North 
America 
Canada 4 4 8
United States 3 7 10
     Subtotal 7 11 18
Total 250 161 411
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Table 3.2: Operating and Lifecycle Cost Estimation 
Lifecycle Cost  Operating Cost 
   Variable     Coef.  Std. Err.     Coef.  Std. Err. 
Onshore 
Density  2.10824  3.247069  2.094717*  1.181438 
Depth  0.11171**  0.056014  0.0651126***  0.0203805 
Reservoir Pressure  ‐0.91181**  0.4004117  ‐0.4808187***  0.1456888 
Elevation  0.776391**  0.3034689  0.3647722***  0.1104164 
Dimensions  ‐221.6556***  0.3034689  ‐128.3666***  9.590256 
Total oil  25.1265***  2.616002  14.25148***  0.9518258 
(Total Oil)²   0.00005***  0.0000097  0.0000122***  0.0000035 
Constant  534.9001***  110.7855  213.5349***  40.30903 
Offshore 
Density  ‐28.78609***  8.530702  ‐11.18806***  3.554716 
Depth  ‐0.3744166**  0.1471098  ‐0.1491342**  0.0613002 
Reservoir Pressure  3.998208***  1.173586  1.479914***  0.4890295 
Water Depth  0.6325717***  0.2194769  0.1330714  0.0914553 
Dimensions  ‐17.33516  86.61364  ‐84.79935**  36.09162 
Total Oil  12.75725  8.292075  12.78538***  3.45528 
(Total Oil)²   ‐0.0043879***  0.0005644  ‐0.0015654***  0.0002352 
Constant     1640.11***  356.897     675.8393***  148.7178 
Note: Asterisk *, double asterisk ** and triple asterisk *** denote variables significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.3: Total Production Under Each Scenario (Million bbl/yr) 
   Decreases in World Demand 
Country Actual Production 2010 Steady Production 2010 2.5% 5% 10% 
Russia 3,748.67 3,660.32 3,584.62 3,584.62 3,480.78
Saudi Arabia 3,652.51 3,652.51 3,652.51 3,652.51 3,652.51 
United States 2,742.25 2,742.25 2,742.25 2,643.26 2,551.12 
Iran 1,549.42 1,544.88 1,544.88 1,544.88 1,533.68 
China 1,485.96 1,467.29 1,444.18 1,411.85 1,311.44 
Canada 1,217.79 1,189.63 1,189.63 1,189.63 663.27 
Mexico 1,079.74 1,044.32 1,044.32 1,038.66 1,025.28 
UAE 1,039.71 1,039.71 1,039.71 1,039.71 1,039.71 
Kuwait 915.49 915.49 915.49 915.49 915.49 
Venezuela 902.04 902.04 887.59 873.21 873.21 
Iraq 897.79 897.79 897.79 897.79 897.79 
Nigeria 876.59 876.59 876.59 876.59 876.59 
Brazil 780.16 772.31 752.41 703.86 589.02 
Angola 675.62 188.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Algeria 660.32 660.32 660.32 660.32 660.32 
Kazakhstan 641.14 641.14 641.14 641.14 641.14 
Libya 605.55 605.55 605.55 605.55 605.55 
Qatar 572.58 572.58 572.58 572.58 572.58 
Norway (North) 515.43 515.43 515.43 515.43 515.43 
United Kingdom 488.78 472.06 432.49 338.31 267.37 
Azerbaijan 378.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Afghanistan 378.42 378.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Indonesia 359.96 346.47 323.15 301.09 153.80 
India 358.04 348.33 323.86 316.74 169.07 
Oman 315.57 315.57 315.57 315.57 315.57 
Colombia 292.23 291.05 291.05 286.04 286.04 
Egypt 268.81 251.58 251.58 251.58 246.22 
Norway (South) 264.57 264.57 264.57 264.57 264.57 
Malaysia 261.30 261.30 261.30 261.30 261.30 
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Table 3.3 Continued 
Argentina 237.60 214.12 181.93 171.48 171.48
Australia 205.30 191.58 156.19 148.38 148.38 
Ecuador 180.71 180.71 180.71 180.71 180.71 
Sudan 177.39 177.39 177.39 177.39 177.39 
Syria 140.53 140.53 140.53 140.53 140.53 
Vietnam 134.89 134.89 134.89 134.89 134.89 
Thailand 121.95 108.52 108.52 94.10 52.70 
Congo 106.57 106.57 106.57 106.57 106.57 
Equitorial Guinea 99.98 99.98 99.98 99.98 99.98 
Yemen 96.43 74.86 74.86 74.86 74.86 
Denmark 91.05 91.05 91.05 0.00 0.00 
Gabon 89.43 89.43 89.43 89.43 89.43 
Turkmenistan 78.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Turkey 72.36 72.11 72.11 72.11 70.36 
Japan 68.18 39.25 23.90 0.00 0.00 
Brunei 62.85 62.85 62.85 62.85 62.85 
Peru 57.36 57.06 57.06 51.21 51.21 
Trinidad and Tobago 53.25 53.25 53.25 31.52 31.52 
Madagascar 44.51 44.51 44.51 44.51 44.51 
Chad 44.50 44.50 44.50 44.50 44.50 
Italy 38.72 20.56 20.56 18.33 0.00 
Romania 32.53 32.53 32.53 32.53 32.53 
Uzbekistan 31.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cuba 30.18 24.65 24.65 22.83 22.83 
Tunisia 29.04 29.04 29.04 6.31 0.00 
Bangladesh 28.90 27.27 27.27 27.27 27.27 
South Korea 27.28 27.28 27.28 27.28 0.00 
Taiwan 18.25 15.89 15.89 0.00 0.00 
Cambodia 17.35 17.35 17.35 0.00 0.00 
Germany 17.00 16.78 16.78 16.78 16.78 
Bahrain 12.26 12.26 12.26 12.26 12.26 
Chile 11.54 11.54 3.52 0.00 0.00 
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Table 3.3 Continued 
Ukraine 9.81 8.94 8.94 6.25 4.34
Philippines 9.81 8.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Myanmar 9.37 6.52 6.52 0.00 0.00 
Moldova 7.64 7.64 7.64 7.64 6.04 
Suriname 7.52 7.52 7.52 7.52 0.00 
Greece 5.53 5.53 5.53 4.30 1.08 
Ireland 4.38 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.00 
Spain 4.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bulgaria 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 2.79 
Bolivia 3.09 1.62 1.62 0.00 0.00 
Faroe Islands 2.85 2.85 2.85 2.85 2.85 
France 2.25 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.00 
Hungary 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24 
Guatemala 1.70 1.70 1.70 0.00 0.00 
Latvia 1.41 1.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Barbados 1.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pakistan 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 
Netherlands 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.00 
Croatia 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.00 
Mongolia 0.55 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Serbia and Montenegro 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 
Tajikistan 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Czech Republic 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Poland 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total Production 30,464.36 29,099.46 28,210.37 27,629.56 26,183.39 
Price (U.S. Dollars) $67.34 $47.05 $31.83 $21.33 
"Steady Production" refers to the total amount of oil that is cost feasible if the price of $67.34 per barrel were to persist. 
It is, therefore, the oil that can be produced at a lifetime cost per barrel of less than $67.34, as opposed to  
"Actual Production 2010", which is the oil that can be produced at an operating cost per barrel of less than $67.34. 
The last row labeled "Price" displays the market price for a barrel of oil under each scenario. 
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Table 3.4: Percentage Change in Per Capita GDP Under Each Scenario 
Country 2010 Oil Revenue 
2010 Oil 
Revenue as 
Percent of GDP 
2.5% 5% 10% Per Capita GDP Population 
GDP  
(1000s) 
Afghanistan $25,484,032,271 83.77% -83.77% -83.77% -83.77% $1,000            30,419,928  $30,419,928 
Kuwait $61,651,842,305 55.87% -16.84% -29.46% -38.17% $41,700              2,646,314  $110,351,294 
Libya $40,779,484,333 51.52% -15.53% -27.17% -35.20% $14,100              5,613,380  $79,148,658 
Equitorial Guinea $6,733,244,587 50.86% -15.33% -26.82% -34.75% $19,300                 685,991 $13,239,626 
Iraq $60,460,018,790 49.80% -15.01% -26.26% -34.03% $3,900            31,129,225  $121,403,978 
Angola $45,498,724,866 42.00% -42.00% -42.00% -42.00% $6,000            18,056,072  $108,336,432 
Saudi Arabia $245,971,605,944 37.84% -11.40% -19.95% -25.85% $24,500            26,534,504  $650,095,348 
Congo $7,176,962,968 35.73% -10.77% -18.84% -24.42% $4,600              4,366,266  $20,084,824 
UAE $70,017,246,930 27.62% -8.32% -14.57% -18.87% $47,700              5,314,317  $253,492,921 
Azerbaijan $25,484,033,618 26.32% -26.32% -26.32% -26.32% $10,200              9,493,600  $96,834,720 
Oman $21,251,347,431 25.57% -7.70% -13.48% -17.47% $26,900              3,090,150  $83,125,035 
Gabon $6,022,162,399 22.83% -6.88% -12.04% -15.60% $16,400              1,608,321  $26,376,464 
Brunei $4,232,432,420 20.71% -6.24% -10.92% -14.15% $50,000                408,786  $20,439,300 
Norway $52,527,629,198 20.59% -6.20% -10.86% -14.07% $54,200              4,707,270  $255,134,034 
Qatar $38,559,602,665 19.98% -6.02% -10.54% -13.65% $98,900              1,951,591  $193,012,350 
Kazakhstan $43,176,673,999 18.67% -5.63% -9.84% -12.75% $13,200            17,522,010  $231,290,532 
Venezuela $60,746,227,245 17.05% -5.33% -9.25% -11.82% $12,700            28,047,938  $356,208,813 
Algeria $44,467,881,980 16.08% -4.85% -8.48% -10.99% $7,400            37,367,226  $276,517,472 
Madagascar $2,997,359,651 15.13% -4.56% -7.98% -10.34% $900            22,005,222  $19,804,700 
Trinidad and Tobago $3,585,917,057 14.40% -4.34% -10.37% -11.70% $20,300              1,226,383  $24,895,575 
Chad $2,996,770,777 14.37% -4.33% -7.58% -9.82% $1,900            10,975,648  $20,853,731 
Nigeria $59,032,343,718 13.35% -4.02% -7.04% -9.12% $2,600          170,123,740  $442,321,724 
Turkmenistan $5,304,677,059 13.28% -13.28% -13.28% -13.28% $7,900              5,054,828  $39,933,141 
Sudan $11,946,003,780 12.93% -3.90% -6.82% -8.84% $2,700            34,206,710  $92,358,117 
Faroe Islands $192,234,459 12.74% -3.84% -6.72% -8.70% $30,500                   49,483  $1,509,232 
Yemen $6,493,833,916 11.40% -5.22% -7.22% -8.59% $2,300            24,771,809  $56,975,161 
Russia $252,447,566,236 10.42% -3.46% -5.71% -7.36% $17,000          142,517,670  $2,422,800,390 
Iran $104,342,837,043 10.02% -3.04% -5.30% -6.88% $13,200            78,868,711  $1,041,066,985 
Suriname $506,152,579 9.41% -2.84% -4.96% -9.41% $9,600                 560,157  $5,377,507 
Ecuador $12,169,364,804 9.30% -2.80% -4.90% -6.35% $8,600            15,223,680  $130,923,648 
Syria $9,463,466,881 8.24% -2.48% -4.34% -5.63% $5,100            22,530,746  $114,906,805 
Canada $82,009,641,920 5.82% -1.85% -3.13% -4.81% $41,100            34,300,083  $1,409,733,411 
Mexico $72,713,309,429 4.27% -1.39% -2.33% -2.99% $14,800          114,975,406  $1,701,636,009 
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Table 3.4 Continued 
Columbia $19,679,885,956 4.18% -1.27% -2.25% -2.89% $10,400            45,239,079  $470,486,422 
Moldova $514,386,887 4.14% -1.25% -2.18% -3.10% $3,400              3,656,843  $12,433,266 
Malaysia $17,596,835,976 3.82% -1.15% -2.01% -2.61% $15,800            29,179,952  $461,043,242 
Cambodia $1,168,250,964 3.55% -1.07% -3.55% -3.55% $2,200            14,952,665  $32,895,863 
Egypt $18,102,649,130 3.28% -1.13% -1.83% -2.33% $6,600            83,688,164  $552,341,882 
Denmark $6,131,780,519 2.94% -0.89% -2.94% -2.94% $37,600              5,543,453  $208,433,833 
Vietnam $9,083,631,583 2.92% -0.88% -1.54% -1.99% $3,400            91,519,289  $311,165,583 
Bahrain $825,886,273 2.37% -0.71% -1.25% -1.62% $27,900              1,248,348  $34,828,909 
Uzbekistan $2,143,465,552 2.29% -2.29% -2.29% -2.29% $3,300            28,394,180  $93,700,794 
Brazil $52,538,181,209 2.22% -0.72% -1.27% -1.69% $11,900          199,321,413  $2,371,924,815 
Argentina $16,000,748,014 2.14% -1.00% -1.41% -1.65% $17,700            42,192,494  $746,807,144 
Indonesia $24,240,697,344 2.07% -0.77% -1.25% -1.79% $4,700          248,645,008  $1,168,631,538 
Tunisia $1,955,834,464 1.90% -0.57% -1.70% -1.90% $9,600            10,732,900  $103,035,840 
Cuba $2,032,093,785 1.85% -0.80% -1.19% -1.41% $9,900            11,075,244  $109,644,916 
Australia $13,825,305,260 1.54% -0.72% -1.01% -1.19% $40,800            22,015,576  $898,235,501 
United Kingdom $32,916,119,427 1.43% -0.54% -0.96% -1.18% $36,600            63,047,162  $2,307,526,129 
Thailand $8,212,451,694 1.29% -0.49% -0.82% -1.11% $9,500            67,091,089  $637,365,346 
Peru $3,863,004,916 1.28% -0.39% -0.74% -0.92% $10,200            29,549,517  $301,405,073 
Barbados $85,335,536 1.25% -1.25% -1.25% -1.25% $23,700                 287,733  $6,819,272 
US $184,671,453,499 1.20% -0.36% -0.65% -0.85% $49,000          313,847,465  $15,378,525,785 
Myanmar $631,227,686 0.89% -0.46% -0.89% -0.89% $1,300            54,584,650  $70,960,045 
China $100,069,247,292 0.88% -0.28% -0.48% -0.63% $8,500        1,343,239,923  $11,417,539,346 
Romania $2,190,597,686 0.80% -0.24% -0.42% -0.54% $12,600            21,848,504  $275,291,150 
Bangladesh $1,946,018,841 0.71% -0.24% -0.39% -0.50% $1,700          161,083,804  $273,842,467 
India $24,111,479,078 0.54% -0.20% -0.31% -0.46% $3,700        1,205,073,612  $4,458,772,364 
Turkey $4,872,931,506 0.42% -0.13% -0.22% -0.29% $14,700            79,749,461  $1,172,317,077 
Bolivia $208,046,713 0.41% -0.26% -0.41% -0.41% $4,900            10,290,003  $50,421,015 
Latvia $95,263,628 0.27% -0.27% -0.27% -0.27% $15,900              2,191,580  $34,846,122 
Chile $777,281,041 0.26% -0.21% -0.26% -0.26% $17,400            17,067,369  $296,972,221 
Mongolia $37,127,538 0.24% -0.24% -0.24% -0.24% $4,800              3,179,997  $15,263,986 
Bulgaria $229,182,437 0.24% -0.07% -0.12% -0.17% $13,800              7,037,935  $97,123,503 
Ukraine $660,439,235 0.20% -0.07% -0.14% -0.17% $7,300            44,854,065  $327,434,675 
Guatemala $114,772,988 0.16% -0.05% -0.16% -0.16% $5,100            14,099,032  $71,905,063 
Ireland $295,141,829 0.16% -0.14% -0.15% -0.16% $40,100              4,722,028  $189,353,323 
Philippines $660,303,121 0.16% -0.16% -0.16% -0.16% $4,100          103,775,002  $425,477,508 
Taiwan $1,229,018,623 0.14% -0.05% -0.14% -0.14% $38,200            23,234,936  $887,574,555 
Italy $2,607,531,670 0.14% -0.09% -0.11% -0.14% $30,900            61,261,254  $1,892,972,749 
Greece $372,297,494 0.13% -0.04% -0.08% -0.12% $26,600            10,767,827  $286,424,198 
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Table 3.4 Continued 
Tajikistan $20,759,929 0.13% -0.13% -0.13% -0.13% $2,100              7,768,385  $16,313,609 
South Korea $1,836,985,961 0.12% -0.04% -0.06% -0.12% $32,100            48,860,500  $1,568,422,050 
Japan $4,591,476,338 0.10% -0.08% -0.10% -0.10% $35,200          127,368,088  $4,483,356,698 
Hungary $150,664,876 0.08% -0.02% -0.04% -0.05% $19,800              9,958,453  $197,177,369 
Serbia and Montenegro $36,606,616 0.05% -0.01% -0.02% -0.03% $10,800              7,276,604  $78,587,323 
Croatia $38,254,624 0.05% -0.01% -0.02% -0.05% $18,400              4,480,043  $82,432,791 
Germany $1,144,557,513 0.04% -0.01% -0.02% -0.03% $38,400            81,305,856  $3,122,144,870 
Spain $292,445,662 0.02% -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% $31,000            47,042,984  $1,458,332,504 
Pakistan $75,335,597 0.01% 0.00% -0.01% -0.01% $2,800          190,291,129  $532,815,161 
Netherlands $57,928,904 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% $42,700            16,730,632  $714,397,986 
France $151,383,117 0.01% 0.00% -0.01% -0.01% $35,600            65,630,692  $2,336,452,635 
Czech Republic $16,298,547 0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% $27,400            10,177,300  $278,858,020 
Poland $14,917,314 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $20,600            38,415,284  $791,354,850 
Sorted by “2010 Oil Revenue as Percentage of GDP” 
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Table 3.5: Change in "U.S. Oil Independence" Under Each Scenario 
Scenario 
Source of 
Demand 
Reduction 
U.S. Consumption 
(Million Bbl/Yr) 
Domestic 
Production 
(Million 
Bbl/Yr) 
Percentage Met 
Domestically 
Percentage 
Change 
Baseline   6989.07 2742.25 39.24% - 
2.5% All U.S. 6290.17 2742.25 43.60% 11.11% 
Proportional 6814.35 40.24% 2.56% 
5% All U.S. 5591.26 2643.26 47.27% 20.49% 
Proportional 6639.62 39.81% 1.46% 
10% All U.S. 4193.44 2551.12 60.84% 55.05% 
Proportional 6290.17 40.56% 3.37% 
Note: For each scenario "All U.S." means that the entire reduction in world demand of 2.5%, 5%, or 
10% came from the U.S. In 2010 the U.S. consumed approximately 25% of the world’s produced 
oil. To reduce world demand by 5%, the U.S. would need to reduce demand by 20% (20% x 25% = 
5%). For each scenario “Proportional” means that world demand is reduced by the same percentage 
as world demand (i.e., 2.5%, 5%, or 10%) “Percentage Met Domestically” is “Domestic 
Production” divided by “U.S. Consumption”. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – In Sample Estimates for Oil, Natural Gas, Coal, and Electricity Using LA/GAI and LA/AI Compared to Actual 
Consumption 
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Figure 2.2 – Demand Curves for Each Commodity with LA/GAI and LA/AI 
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Figure 3.1: World Oil Supply Curve 
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Figure 4.1 – Illustration of Vulnerability Premium with Foreign Trade  
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Figure 4.2: U.S. Oil Supply and Demand Curves 
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